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Friday, May 31, 2013

Little Cause for Inflation Worries

Periodically I am asked whether we should worry about inflation, given how much money the Federal Reserve has pumped into the economy. Based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis data released Friday morning, this answer is still emphatically no.

The personal consumption expenditures, or P.C.E., price index, which the Fed has said it prefers to other measures of inflation, fell from March to April by 0.25 percent. On a year-over-year basis, it was up by just 0.74 percent. Those figures are quite low by historical standards, and helped push consumer spending up. (Measured in nominal terms, consumer spending fell slightly in April. After adjusting for inflation, it rose.)

When looking at price changes, a lot of economists like to strip out food and energy, since costs in those spending categories can be volatile. Instead they focus on so-called “core inflation.” On a monthly basis, core inflation was flat. But year over year, this core index grew just 1.05 percent, which is the lowest pace since the government started keeping track more than five decades ago.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, via Haver Analytics. The core P.C.E. price index refers to the price index change for personal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, via Haver Analytics. The core P.C.E. price index refers to the price index change for personal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy.

Low inflation may be one reason that consumers have proven so resilient in recent months (in addition to the lift they’re getting from rising home prices). A measure of consumer sentiment released Friday by the University of Michigan surged in May, and is at its highest level since July 2007.



Kissing Away the Corporate Tax

My column on Wednesday startled some readers. Was I proposing to do away with corporate taxes simply because globalization is making it easier for multinational companies to avoid them? Should we really just roll over and accept defeat?

Well, other advanced nations seem on their way to doing exactly that.

They have found a way of reducing corporate tax rates that improves economic efficiency, lowers the cost of capital for their companies and may even increase the progressivity of their tax system: offsetting those lower corporate rates with higher tax rates on the income that companies provide to their shareholders.

Since 2000, the top corporate tax rate in Britain has fallen to 23 percent, from 30 percent; in France it has receded to 34.4 percent, from 37.8 percent, and in Denmark it has declined to 25 percent, from 32 percent, according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Many of these countries have compensated for lowering the corporate rates by taxing dividends more. Over the same period, the dividend tax rate rose to 30.6 percent in Britain, from 25 percent; in France, it went to 44 percent from 40.8 percent, and in Denmark it rose to 42 percent from 40 percent. Most industrial countries have also eliminated exemptions to prevent double taxation of dividends.

The United States has rowed in the opposite direction. Companies complain, rightly, that the corporate tax rate in the United States is too high compared to those of its peers: 39.1 percent, combining federal and state taxes - virtually the same as it was 13 years ago. But they rarely mention that the tax on profits flowing to shareholders has fallen drastically.

Even after the New Year’s budget deal raised taxes on the highest earners, the 20 percent top rate for dividends and long-term capital gains remains much lower than in the 1990s â€" when the top capital gains tax was 28 percent, and dividends were taxed as ordinary income.

A paper published a couple of years ago by Rosanne Altshuler of Rutgers, Benjamin H. Harris of the Brookings Institution and Eric Toder of the Tax Policy Center suggested that the American mix is particularly inefficient.

Because American corporate tax mostly falls on domestic profits (foreign profits retained abroad pay no tax), it raises the cost of domestic investment and encourages companies to invest abroad. It also encourages them to seek out low-tax havens around the world to park their profits. And it encourages companies to shed their corporate status to avoid the tax altogether.

The Altshuler-Harris-Toder paper suggests that reducing the corporate tax rate and increasing taxes on dividends and capital gains would be a much more efficient way to raise money.

Their calculation â€" which is only rough because it assumes no change in the behavior of companies or their shareholders â€" suggests that raising the top tax on long-term capital gains to 28 percent and taxing dividends as ordinary income (which faced a top rate of 35 percent at the time of the study) would raise enough money to pay for a cut in the federal corporate tax rate from 35 to 26 percent.

But the most interesting bit of the study is their finding that these changes would make the tax structure more progressive - increasing the tax burden on Americans with the highest incomes. That’s because the rich would bear the brunt of the increase in the dividend and capital gains tax.

Even assuming that shareholders bear the entire burden of corporate taxation â€" an assumption that is being questioned in the economic literature â€" the change suggested by the economists would lower the average federal tax rate of everybody except the top 1 percent of Americans, who would suffer a tax increase of 1 percent.

Under a different assumption â€" that corporate taxes are mostly paid by workers because of the impact of the tax on investment, jobs and wages â€" the progressivity would be steeper. In particular, those in the top percentile of income would see their taxes rise by 1.8 percent.

So getting rid of corporate taxes â€" or at least reducing them substantially â€" may not be such a bad idea. The tax burden would just have to be shifted from the companies to their owners.



Kissing Away the Corporate Tax

My column on Wednesday startled some readers. Was I proposing to do away with corporate taxes simply because globalization is making it easier for multinational companies to avoid them? Should we really just roll over and accept defeat?

Well, other advanced nations seem on their way to doing exactly that.

They have found a way of reducing corporate tax rates that improves economic efficiency, lowers the cost of capital for their companies and may even increase the progressivity of their tax system: offsetting those lower corporate rates with higher tax rates on the income that companies provide to their shareholders.

Since 2000, the top corporate tax rate in Britain has fallen to 23 percent, from 30 percent; in France it has receded to 34.4 percent, from 37.8 percent, and in Denmark it has declined to 25 percent, from 32 percent, according to data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Many of these countries have compensated for lowering the corporate rates by taxing dividends more. Over the same period, the dividend tax rate rose to 30.6 percent in Britain, from 25 percent; in France, it went to 44 percent from 40.8 percent, and in Denmark it rose to 42 percent from 40 percent. Most industrial countries have also eliminated exemptions to prevent double taxation of dividends.

The United States has rowed in the opposite direction. Companies complain, rightly, that the corporate tax rate in the United States is too high compared to those of its peers: 39.1 percent, combining federal and state taxes - virtually the same as it was 13 years ago. But they rarely mention that the tax on profits flowing to shareholders has fallen drastically.

Even after the New Year’s budget deal raised taxes on the highest earners, the 20 percent top rate for dividends and long-term capital gains remains much lower than in the 1990s â€" when the top capital gains tax was 28 percent, and dividends were taxed as ordinary income.

A paper published a couple of years ago by Rosanne Altshuler of Rutgers, Benjamin H. Harris of the Brookings Institution and Eric Toder of the Tax Policy Center suggested that the American mix is particularly inefficient.

Because American corporate tax mostly falls on domestic profits (foreign profits retained abroad pay no tax), it raises the cost of domestic investment and encourages companies to invest abroad. It also encourages them to seek out low-tax havens around the world to park their profits. And it encourages companies to shed their corporate status to avoid the tax altogether.

The Altshuler-Harris-Toder paper suggests that reducing the corporate tax rate and increasing taxes on dividends and capital gains would be a much more efficient way to raise money.

Their calculation â€" which is only rough because it assumes no change in the behavior of companies or their shareholders â€" suggests that raising the top tax on long-term capital gains to 28 percent and taxing dividends as ordinary income (which faced a top rate of 35 percent at the time of the study) would raise enough money to pay for a cut in the federal corporate tax rate from 35 to 26 percent.

But the most interesting bit of the study is their finding that these changes would make the tax structure more progressive - increasing the tax burden on Americans with the highest incomes. That’s because the rich would bear the brunt of the increase in the dividend and capital gains tax.

Even assuming that shareholders bear the entire burden of corporate taxation â€" an assumption that is being questioned in the economic literature â€" the change suggested by the economists would lower the average federal tax rate of everybody except the top 1 percent of Americans, who would suffer a tax increase of 1 percent.

Under a different assumption â€" that corporate taxes are mostly paid by workers because of the impact of the tax on investment, jobs and wages â€" the progressivity would be steeper. In particular, those in the top percentile of income would see their taxes rise by 1.8 percent.

So getting rid of corporate taxes â€" or at least reducing them substantially â€" may not be such a bad idea. The tax burden would just have to be shifted from the companies to their owners.



Little Cause for Inflation Worries

Periodically I am asked whether we should worry about inflation, given how much money the Federal Reserve has pumped into the economy. Based on the Bureau of Economic Analysis data released Friday morning, this answer is still emphatically no.

The personal consumption expenditures, or P.C.E., price index, which the Fed has said it prefers to other measures of inflation, fell from March to April by 0.25 percent. On a year-over-year basis, it was up by just 0.74 percent. Those figures are quite low by historical standards, and helped push consumer spending up. (Measured in nominal terms, consumer spending fell slightly in April. After adjusting for inflation, it rose.)

When looking at price changes, a lot of economists like to strip out food and energy, since costs in those spending categories can be volatile. Instead they focus on so-called “core inflation.” On a monthly basis, core inflation was flat. But year over year, this core index grew just 1.05 percent, which is the lowest pace since the government started keeping track more than five decades ago.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, via Haver Analytics. The core P.C.E. price index refers to the price index change for personal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, via Haver Analytics. The core P.C.E. price index refers to the price index change for personal consumption expenditures, excluding food and energy.

Low inflation may be one reason that consumers have proven so resilient in recent months (in addition to the lift they’re getting from rising home prices). A measure of consumer sentiment released Friday by the University of Michigan surged in May, and is at its highest level since July 2007.



Affordable Care Act Could Be Good for Entrepreneurship

The Affordable Care Act is expected to produce a sharp increase in entrepreneurship next year, according to a new report from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the Urban Institute and Georgetown University’s Health Policy Institute. The number of self-employed people is expected to rise by 1.5 million â€" a relative increase of more than 11 percent â€" as a direct result of the health care overhaul.

One major barrier to entrepreneurship in the United States â€" beside the usual risks involved with starting a company â€" is that it has been difficult to get health insurance on the individual market. Those who do end up founding or joining a start-up are often able to do so because they have a spouse with employer-sponsored insurance, or because they are keeping a day job with a bigger company. (This was the case, for example, for most of the people involved with Leap2, a Kansas City start-up that I profiled last fall.)

Economists have looked at whether this insurance-related job lock is deterring self-employment and the formation of new businesses, and the data suggest it is. A Journal of Health Economics paper, for example, found that business ownership rates jumped sharply from just under age 65 to just over age 65, when people become newly eligible for Medicare. Using Current Population Survey data, the same paper also found that wage and salary workers are more likely to start businesses from one year to the next if they have a spouse with employer-based insurance.

A working paper from the Upjohn Institute looked at a change in the law in New Jersey that expanded access to individual health insurance. It found that the law seemed to increase self-employment, particularly among “unmarried, older, and observably less-healthy individuals.”

The report released Friday applies those findings to a model of what will happen in 2014, based on the Affordable Care Act’s provisions for “universal availability of non-group coverage, the financial assistance available for it, and other related market reforms.” The authors also adjusted their numbers depending on the access that residents of various states already have to individual health insurance. (Vermont, for example, already has a statute that allows the self-employed to obtain small group coverage.) Over all, they found, the ranks of the self-employed are likely to rise 11.5 percent, from about 13.1 million to 14.6 million. A table with their state-by-state estimates is below.

By the way, the paper does not mention this, but the same forces that will make it easier for workers to become self-employed may also make it easier for workers to retire early. I have heard anecdotally about people in their late 50s or early 60s who would like to retire but can’t do so because they’re basically uninsurable (for now) on the individual market; I wonder if we’ll notice a wave of retirements in this age group come 2014.

State Self Employment Absent A.C.A. Self-Employment Post-A.C.A. Changes Increase Due to A.C.A. % Increase Due to A.C.A.
Alabama 118,000 134,000 16,000 13.6%
Alaska 31,000 35,000 4,000 12.9%
Arizona 301,000 340,000 39,000 13.0%
Arkansas 99,000 112,000 13,000 13.1%
California 1,901,000 2,149,000 248,000 13.0%
Colorado 304,000 331,000 27,000 8.9%
Connecticut 185,000 202,000 17,000 9.2%
Delaware 31,000 33,000 2,000 6.5%
District of Columbia 21,000 24,000 3,000 14.3%
Florida 819,000 891,000 72,000 8.8%
Georgia 432,000 488,000 56,000 13.0%
Hawaii 58,000 63,000 5,000 8.6%
Idaho 83,000 94,000 11,000 13.3%
Illinois 475,000 537,000 62,000 13.1%
Indiana 224,000 253,000 29,000 12.9%
Iowa 148,000 167,000 19,000 12.8%
Kansas 116,000 131,000 15,000 12.9%
Kentucky 150,000 170,000 20,000 13.3%
Louisiana 179,000 203,000 24,000 13.4%
Maine 73,000 79,000 6,000 8.2%
Maryland 231,000 261,000 30,000 13.0%
Massachusetts 281,000 281,000 0 0.0%
Michigan 317,000 344,000 27,000 8.5%
Minnesota 258,000 292,000 34,000 13.2%
Mississippi 102,000 110,000 8,000 7.8%
Missouri 242,000 273,000 31,000 12.8%
Montana 72,000 81,000 9,000 12.5%
Nebraska 104,000 117,000 13,000 12.5%
Nevada 104,000 117,000 13,000 12.5%
New Hampshire 74,000 81,000 7,000 9.5%
New Jersey 304,000 330,000 26,000 8.6%
New Mexico 94,000 106,000 12,000 12.8%
New York 743,000 808,000 65,000 8.7%
North Carolina 378,000 411,000 33,000 8.7%
North Dakota 52,000 58,000 6,000 11.5%
Ohio 514,000 581,000 67,000 13.0%
Oklahoma 173,000 196,000 23,000 13.3%
Oregon 212,000 240,000 28,000 13.2%
Pennsylvania 464,000 524,000 60,000 12.9%
Rhode Island 43,000 46,000 3,000 7.0%
South Carolina 155,000 176,000 21,000 13.5%
South Dakota 57,000 65,000 8,000 14.0%
Tennessee 258,000 292,000 34,000 13.2%
Texas 955,000 1,079,000 124,000 13.0%
Utah 99,000 112,000 13,000 13.1%
Vermont 41,000 41,000 0 0.0%
Virgina 333,000 376,000 43,000 12.9%
Washington 346,000 376,000 30,000 8.7%
West Virginia 46,000 52,000 6,000 13.0%
Wisconsin 256,000 290,000 34,000 13.3%
Wyoming 32,000 36,000 4,000 12.5%


How to Cure the College Dropout Syndrome

Jeffrey Selingo, the former editor of The Chronicle of Higher Education and currently an editor at large there, is the author of a new book, “College (Un)Bound.” In it, he argues that the higher-education system is both vital to the American economy and “broken.” My exchange with him, edited slightly, follows.

Q.

You start your book by telling the story of a young woman named Samantha Dietz and describing the widespread phenomenon of enrolling in college without graduating. You write: “Only slightly more than 50 percent of American students who enter college leave with a bachelor’s degree. Among wealthy countries, only Italy ranks lower.” Why does the United States do a worse job of getting people through college than enrolling them in it?

Jeffrey Selingo, author of “College (Un)Bound.”Jay Premack Photography Jeffrey Selingo, author of “College (Un)Bound.”
A.

College is one of the biggest financial investments we make in our lifetime, yet many families largely make their decision based on emotion. Prospective students start touring colleges in high school, well before they know how much a particular school might actually cost them. They are distracted by the bells and whistles on campus tours, fall in love with a campus and fail to ask the right questions. (Tools like collegerealitycheck.com and the Obama administration’s College Scorecard can help.)

So many students end up poorly matching to their campus. That’s why a third of students now transfer before earning a degree, and many unfortunately simply drop out.

At the same time, we have this fascination with the bachelor’s degree in the United States, and we think everyone needs to earn one at the same point in their lifetime, enrolling at 18 years old. The economy demands that more students have an education after high school, but not everyone is ready for college at 18. Many of them end up in college because we have few maturing alternatives after high school, whether it’s national service, apprenticeships or structured “gap year” experiences.

Finally, campus culture and money play a role. If you go to a college with a low graduation rate, your peers have an impact on your thinking: if no one else is graduating in four years, why should I? Others drop out because their financial situation changes while they are there and they can no longer afford it.

Q.

There is an economic reason we have a fascination with the bachelor’s degree, isn’t there? It brings a huge economic return. The jobless rate for four-year college grads is less than 4 percent, and the wage premium is very large â€" much larger than it once was. As you write, “By almost every measure, college graduates lead healthier and longer lives, have better working conditions, have healthier children who perform better in school, have more interest in art and reading, speak and write more clearly, have a greater acceptance of differences in people and are more civically active.”

How would you respond to the argument that everyone should aspire to a bachelor’s degree? Not everyone will make it. Many would need to start at a community college or with remedial work. But I can’t help but notice that most of the people arguing that “college isn’t for everyone” insist that their own kids go.

A.

I’m not arguing that you shouldn’t aspire to a bachelor’s degree because, as you note, it does bring great economic returns. But why does it need to happen for everyone at 18?

Jacket design by Archie Ferguson; jacket art by Alessandroiryna/iStock photon

For some, a two-year degree might be more appropriate at 18. And recent studies of wage data of college graduates in Virginia, Tennessee and a few other states show that the wage returns of technical two-year degrees are greater than many bachelor’s degrees in the first year after college.

Someone who isn’t ready for a four-year college at 18 and ends up dropping out is in some ways worse off than a high-school graduate who never went to college at all. Sure, college dropouts have some credits, but still no degree, and it’s likely that they have debt.

Let’s think of extending the period for a bachelor’s to be sure more students succeed in getting one. We don’t need alternatives to the bachelor’s degree, just more constructive detours on the pathway to college for those who are not ready at 18.

Q.

That’s a fascinating way of thinking about it: different paths, more than a different destination. (And whatever that study of Tennessee and Virginia shows about the first year after college, I have yet to see evidence that any alternative beats the long-term returns of a bachelor’s degree.)

Given how problematic it is for people to have college debt without a college degree â€" as many people unfortunately do â€" what do you think federal and state policy makers should do to change colleges with low graduation rates?

A.

Well, the first thing federal and state policy makers can do is come up with a better way to measure graduation rates. The current rate counts only first-time students who enroll in the fall and complete degrees in “150 percent of normal time” - six years, for students seeking bachelor’s degrees. It doesn’t include students who transfer to other colleges and then graduate or those who transfer in and graduate. By one estimate, it excludes up to 50 percent of enrolled students.

A national student record database would allow policy makers to track students as they move among colleges. Once we have a better measure, then colleges that do well in actually graduating students should be rewarded, especially for those students who are not expected to complete college. For example, colleges that graduate Pell Grant recipients above the national average or students who are first in their family to go to college should get access to more federal aid for those students.

And all colleges need more skin in the student-loan game. Students are being saddled with higher amounts of debt, and the schools have little responsibility as they encourage more and more families to take on more debt. Right now, the only punishment is that colleges with high default rates are thrown out of the federal program. But that rarely happens. Colleges need to put some of their own dollars at risk if they are asking students and their parents to take on loans above certain amounts.

Q.

The last major section of your book is called “The Future.” So let me ask you to look ahead and predict one significant way in which a typical campus experience at a four-year college will be significantly different in 2023 than it is in 2013.

A.

The biggest difference will be the injection of technology into the curriculum, with more courses taught in hybrid format, meaning a mix of face to face and online. That will allow for a more personalized experience for students so they can learn at their own pace and break the traditional idea of the academic calendar where everyone needs to start in September and end in May.



Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Choosing the Next Head of the Federal Reserve

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

The race is on to determine who will succeed Ben Bernanke as chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Mr. Bernanke’s term expires at the end of January 2014 and, while he might still decide he wishes to stay on, indications from the White House increasingly suggest that a change will be made â€" most likely with a preliminary decision in the next few months.

The leading candidates are Janet Yellen, current vice chairwoman of the Fed; Timothy Geithner, former Treasury secretary and former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York; and Lawrence Summers, former Treasury secretary (under President Clinton) and former head of the National Economic Council (under President Obama).

None of these candidates has made or is likely to make a clear statement about the critical issue for the next decade - how the Federal Reserve should view the financial sector, particularly the various potential causes of systemic risk. This is unfortunate, because the role of the central bank has changed considerably in recent decades, and how to deal with global megabanks will be central to the macroeconomic policy agenda going forward.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the mounting threat to the economy was inflation. At the end of the 1970s, the newly appointed Fed chairman, Paul A. Volcker, and his colleagues decided to bring down inflation through tight monetary policy. This was considered highly contentious at the time, but looking back, it seems sensible.

Inflation is a regressive tax - it hits relatively poor people hardest, in part because they lack access to investments that are good hedges against inflation (like real estate and some kinds of equity). It also distorts all kinds of economic activity and makes it hard to plan for the future. Bringing down inflation was costly - higher interest rates caused a recession, with many jobs lost. But the result was a long period of relatively low inflation.

Through at least the end of the 1960s, people at the top of the Fed thought there was a stable trade-off between inflation and unemployment, so policy makers could lower unemployment by allowing inflation to creep higher. That turned out to be illusory.

Not many people argue in favor of high inflation today.

At an event in his honor last week, Mr. Volcker was interviewed by Donald Kohn (a former vice chairman of the Fed; the two of them and I belong to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee) and emphasized the way in which the policy consensus had shifted by the late 1970s. (I recommend watching the video of this interview, which should be available in a few days on the event Web site.) Mr. Volcker was characteristically modest - and also typically perceptive. When everyone on Main Street sees a problem every day, this helps concentrate the minds of people in power.

The issue today is not control over inflation. There is no sign yet that the crisis of 2008 and resulting easy monetary policy has pushed up inflation, in part because people’s expectations regarding future inflation remain remarkably low and stable.

But the post-Volcker environment of low inflation and low interest rates ushered in a period of hyper-sized finance, both in terms of financial-sector growth relative to the economy and the size of our largest financial institutions. The problems associated now with too-big-to-fail banks, broadly defined, are in part an unintended consequence of successful monetary policy in the 1980s and ’90s. Of course, financial deregulation also played a significant reinforcing role.

More than three years ago, Mr. Volcker himself proposed one of our more significant efforts at re-regulation â€" what is now known as the Volcker Rule, which is designed to take some very high-risk activities out of financial institutions that are central to the functioning of the economy. On Wednesday, Mr. Volcker referred to the lack of progress in putting his eponymous rule into action as a disgrace.

The problem is that the economic rise of very big banks - the only financial institutions that would be adversely affected by the Volcker Rule, which would limit their “proprietary trading” - also greatly increased their political power. The Volcker Rule was enshrined in the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation, but our regulators are a fragmented lot, and in the details of rule-writing, the banks have played regulator vs. regulator with great skill.

More broadly, the new head of the Fed needs to be able and willing to confront the financial sector before threats become too large. Inflation was very much in everyone’s faces in the late 1970s. Inflation is often referred to as a hidden tax, but it’s relatively transparent compared with what happens with the buildup on financial sector risk.

In the boom, people working at megabanks receive very high levels of compensation. In a huge financial crash, there are bailouts - various forms of downside protection - for those people and their creditors. Everyone else has to confront a deep and nasty recession, or worse. This is even more regressive than higher inflation, but it is also less obvious than the falling purchasing power of what is in your wallet and your checking account (i.e., the result of inflation).

Richard Fisher, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has made clear his skepticism of our current financial system - he and Harvey Rosenblum have also made very sensible reform proposals. He would be the ideal candidate to become next Fed chair. Unfortunately, the political power of megabanks means Mr. Fisher is unlikely to be called upon. (In a debate sponsored recently by The Economist, I supported Mr. Fisher’s views and carried the readers’ vote, 82 percent to 18 percent. I doubt that this outcome will sway even the editorial policy of that magazine.)

Eventually, we will need Mr. Fisher or someone with similar views, and a president willing to nominate such a person. Before we get there, however, it seems unavoidable that another destructive credit cycle will ensue.



Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Recessions Save Lives

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

More people die in economic expansions, and fewer die in recessions.  Whether and how policy makers should heed this pattern depends on the hitherto unknown links between mortality and economic activity.

Recessions can be stressful and depressing, especially for the people who lose their jobs.  Suicide rates spike during recessions, and for that reason alone recessions have been called deadly.  Two researchers, David Stuckler and Sanjay Basu, noted that suicides and binge drinking are positively correlated with unemployment and concluded that “Austerity kills” by adding to unemployment.

Even if we could be sure that austerity and related fiscal policies create recessions, it would be premature to conclude that they literally kill people.  Industrial and construction accidents are more common in economic expansions, and less common in recessions because those industries’ activities follow the business cycle.  Overtime hours may be more dangerous than average, and overtime is more common at the peak of the business cycle.  Moreover, the share of people working in construction - one of the most hazardous industries - increases during expansions and falls during recessions.

Highway accidents also follow the business cycle because more vehicles are on the road during economic expansions, and fewer on the road during recessions. (Mr. Stuckley and Mr. Basu noted that the United States’ Great Depression of the 1930s also had abnormally low rates of fatalities due to traffic accidents.)

With more accidents at work and on the road during expansions, expansions have more deaths by such accidents, and recessions have fewer.

It turns out that the business cycle for suicides is more than offset by the business cycle for other deaths.  Mortality and the unemployment rate are negatively correlated.  Christopher J. Ruhm, a professor of public policy and economics at the University of Virginia, has looked at all causes of death and found that most of them - suicide was the exception - occur less frequently at the depths of the business cycle.

Perhaps most surprising is that the business cycle for overall deaths is dominated by the business cycle for deaths among elderly people, perhaps especially elderly women.  Because so many elderly people are retired, they are especially unlikely to have recently been laid off from their job (which can lead to suicide), to drive their car to work hurriedly, or to take part in a dangerous construction project.

We don’t really know how the business cycle for economic activity is connected to the cycle for elderly deaths.  One hypothesis is that economic expansions create air pollution, and air pollution kills elderly people.  Another hypothesis is that nursing homes have more trouble retaining their staffs during expansions because they have to compete with other businesses.  Perhaps family members who are busy at work during expansions spend less time helping their elderly relatives.

Life is valuable, so it may be at least as important to understand what determines mortality and its cycles as it is to understand what causes recessions.



Monday, May 27, 2013

Getting to Tax Reform

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Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform - Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

In recent weeks, the odds favoring tax reform in the not-too-distant future have improved somewhat.

The improving deficit means that tax reform need not raise net revenues, as President Obama has demanded; the controversy about aggressive tax avoidance by Apple and other multinational companies has focused Congress’s attention on a key goal of tax reform, which is fixing the multinational tax regime; and the furor over the Internal Revenue Service and accusations that it targeted conservative groups almost certainly means there will be bipartisan legislation to make sure this doesn’t happen again, thus providing a legislative vehicle for tax reform.

What is missing, unfortunately, is the outline of an actual tax reform bill. Some progress, however, has been made.

The Joint Committee on Taxation has recently published a 568-page report on various tax reform options based on the work of House Ways and Means Committee working groups. The committee has even released draft tax reform legislation involving financial derivatives, small businesses and the international sector.

The Senate Finance Committee has released a number of tax reform options papers related to family taxation, business investment and innovation, international competitiveness and other topics. Many insiders also believe that the recently announced retirement of the committee’s chairman, Senator Max Baucus of Montana, improves the prospects for tax reform because his precarious position as a Democrat from a heavily Republican state limited his ability to lead a contentious debate on the subject.

Almost everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of tax reform should be to lower statutory tax rates and that it should be revenue-neutral, that is, neither raising nor lowering net federal revenues over some reasonable time period. This will require the elimination of many tax expenditures benefiting both individuals and businesses.

But at present, no one has put a single specific, significant tax expenditure on the table for elimination, and that is the rub. The tax reform bills that have been introduced thus far are mostly grandiose, utopian plans to completely replace the entire tax system; they have no chance whatsoever of enactment.

In public discussions of tax reform, commentators and politicians tend to blithely assume that all tax expenditures are equivalent to tax loopholes - illegitimate provisions of the tax code that benefit only special interests. But as I have explained previously, all of the really large tax expenditures benefit broad segments of the population or are regarded as legitimate components of the federal tax system that serve vital national interests, like home ownership, helping people save for retirement or providing them with health insurance.

To be sure, many tax loopholes cannot be defended. But they tend to be small and do not provide much revenue to pay for more than a trivial reduction in tax rates.

One problem for tax reformers is the disparate impact of specific tax deductions on different people. For starters, only about a third of tax filers itemize; the rest use the standard deduction. Among those that itemize, those with high incomes are much more likely to do so than those with more modest incomes. This fact is illustrated in the following table from a recent Congressional Research Service report.

Congressional Research Service analysis of Internal Revenue Service Data

Moreover, use of certain deductions depends on one’s income. For example, the very wealthy get little value from the mortgage interest deduction because the law limits it to mortgages of less than $1 million. But the wealthy are much more likely to use the charitable contributions deduction and to deduct large amounts. The average charitable deduction for those with incomes above $1 million was almost $140,000 in 2010.

Consequently, ending or restricting particular deductions will have very different economic and distributional effects at different income levels. Some of these effects are reviewed in a May 21 report from the Congressional Research Service.

The report notes that the most commonly discussed option for raising revenue by restricting itemized deductions wouldn’t abolish them entirely but would limit their availability in some way. The total amount of deductions claimed could be limited by a dollar amount, they could be limited to a certain percentage of income, there could be floors that allow deductions only over a certain amount and various other schemes.

One problem is that phasing out deductions in some way creates disincentives equivalent to raising marginal tax rates. According to the report, simply eliminating all itemized deductions would be equivalent to raising the top income tax rate by 4.4 percentage points. Eliminating the deductions for state and local taxes or for charitable contributions is equivalent to raising the top rate by 2.2 percentage points.

This means that even if statutory rates are simultaneously reduced, there may not be any reduction in effective marginal tax rates, depending on what deductions are restricted or eliminated and how it is done. Only careful analysis can determine the net impact of any particular proposal.

This is why it is essential to have a detailed tax reform plan to analyze. Vague talk about broadening the tax base and lowering statutory tax rates is insufficient to guide legislation. And it takes more time than most people imagine to work through all the effects of various tax reforms, especially when many provisions of the tax code are being changed simultaneously that may move in opposite directions, economically.

Thus far, the Obama administration has been disengaged from the tax reform effort. But if it is going to happen, this must change. That is one lesson of previous tax reform efforts in 1969, 1976 and 1986, all of which were guided into enactment by strong Treasury Department leadership.



Getting to Tax Reform

DESCRIPTION

Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform - Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

In recent weeks, the odds favoring tax reform in the not-too-distant future have improved somewhat.

The improving deficit means that tax reform need not raise net revenues, as President Obama has demanded; the controversy about aggressive tax avoidance by Apple and other multinational companies has focused Congress’s attention on a key goal of tax reform, which is fixing the multinational tax regime; and the furor over the Internal Revenue Service and accusations that it targeted conservative groups almost certainly means there will be bipartisan legislation to make sure this doesn’t happen again, thus providing a legislative vehicle for tax reform.

What is missing, unfortunately, is the outline of an actual tax reform bill. Some progress, however, has been made.

The Joint Committee on Taxation has recently published a 568-page report on various tax reform options based on the work of House Ways and Means Committee working groups. The committee has even released draft tax reform legislation involving financial derivatives, small businesses and the international sector.

The Senate Finance Committee has released a number of tax reform options papers related to family taxation, business investment and innovation, international competitiveness and other topics. Many insiders also believe that the recently announced retirement of the committee’s chairman, Senator Max Baucus of Montana, improves the prospects for tax reform because his precarious position as a Democrat from a heavily Republican state limited his ability to lead a contentious debate on the subject.

Almost everyone agrees that the ultimate goal of tax reform should be to lower statutory tax rates and that it should be revenue-neutral, that is, neither raising nor lowering net federal revenues over some reasonable time period. This will require the elimination of many tax expenditures benefiting both individuals and businesses.

But at present, no one has put a single specific, significant tax expenditure on the table for elimination, and that is the rub. The tax reform bills that have been introduced thus far are mostly grandiose, utopian plans to completely replace the entire tax system; they have no chance whatsoever of enactment.

In public discussions of tax reform, commentators and politicians tend to blithely assume that all tax expenditures are equivalent to tax loopholes - illegitimate provisions of the tax code that benefit only special interests. But as I have explained previously, all of the really large tax expenditures benefit broad segments of the population or are regarded as legitimate components of the federal tax system that serve vital national interests, like home ownership, helping people save for retirement or providing them with health insurance.

To be sure, many tax loopholes cannot be defended. But they tend to be small and do not provide much revenue to pay for more than a trivial reduction in tax rates.

One problem for tax reformers is the disparate impact of specific tax deductions on different people. For starters, only about a third of tax filers itemize; the rest use the standard deduction. Among those that itemize, those with high incomes are much more likely to do so than those with more modest incomes. This fact is illustrated in the following table from a recent Congressional Research Service report.

Congressional Research Service analysis of Internal Revenue Service Data

Moreover, use of certain deductions depends on one’s income. For example, the very wealthy get little value from the mortgage interest deduction because the law limits it to mortgages of less than $1 million. But the wealthy are much more likely to use the charitable contributions deduction and to deduct large amounts. The average charitable deduction for those with incomes above $1 million was almost $140,000 in 2010.

Consequently, ending or restricting particular deductions will have very different economic and distributional effects at different income levels. Some of these effects are reviewed in a May 21 report from the Congressional Research Service.

The report notes that the most commonly discussed option for raising revenue by restricting itemized deductions wouldn’t abolish them entirely but would limit their availability in some way. The total amount of deductions claimed could be limited by a dollar amount, they could be limited to a certain percentage of income, there could be floors that allow deductions only over a certain amount and various other schemes.

One problem is that phasing out deductions in some way creates disincentives equivalent to raising marginal tax rates. According to the report, simply eliminating all itemized deductions would be equivalent to raising the top income tax rate by 4.4 percentage points. Eliminating the deductions for state and local taxes or for charitable contributions is equivalent to raising the top rate by 2.2 percentage points.

This means that even if statutory rates are simultaneously reduced, there may not be any reduction in effective marginal tax rates, depending on what deductions are restricted or eliminated and how it is done. Only careful analysis can determine the net impact of any particular proposal.

This is why it is essential to have a detailed tax reform plan to analyze. Vague talk about broadening the tax base and lowering statutory tax rates is insufficient to guide legislation. And it takes more time than most people imagine to work through all the effects of various tax reforms, especially when many provisions of the tax code are being changed simultaneously that may move in opposite directions, economically.

Thus far, the Obama administration has been disengaged from the tax reform effort. But if it is going to happen, this must change. That is one lesson of previous tax reform efforts in 1969, 1976 and 1986, all of which were guided into enactment by strong Treasury Department leadership.



Untangling What Companies Pay in Taxes

The tax filings of companies, like those of individuals, are confidential. When individual companies want to make the case that they pay large amounts of tax â€" as many do â€" they often point to complex calculations from their financial statements that portray the companies in the best light. For an outsider, it can be hard to know how many accounting assumptions go into these calculations and how accurately they reflect the company's actual tax payments.

But there is one standardized measure of corporate taxes that allows for meaningful comparisons among companies and industries. It is known as Cash Taxes Paid and appears in the public reports that companies are required to file for investors. The category reflects the combined amount of corporate income tax that a company pays in a given year, to foreign governments, the United States government and state and local governments.

This number often varies significantly from year to year, depending on a company's accounting strategy and on how many tax breaks it qualifies for that year. As a result, a single year's Cash Taxes Paid number can be misleading. But in a 2008 academic paper, three accounting professors - Scott Dyreng of Duke, Michelle Hanlon of M.I.T. and Edward Maydew of the University of North Carolina - suggested that looking at several years, at least, could offer insight into corporate taxes.

For a column for the Sunday Review this week, I asked S&P Capital IQ, a financial research group, to collect the last six fiscal years of Cash Taxes Paid for the companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index. Capital IQ then compared these numbers to the companies' pretax earnings, including unusual items, for the same six years. Together, the two statistics create an effective tax rate for each company, as well for various industries.

The numbers show that oil companies and retailers pay relatively high tax rates, as you can see in this chart. Technology companies, pharmaceutical companies and utilities have lower-than-average tax rates. In all, the average rate for the S.&P. 500 was 29.1 percent over last six years.

The number helps make clear that despite a relatively high official corporate income-tax rate of 35 percent in the United States, most companies do not pay nearly that much, thanks to loopholes. Remember: the 29.1 percent includes not only federal corporate income taxes but also foreign, state and local.

Soft-drink companies are among those paying taxes well below average, partly because of their ability to locate the manufacturing plants for soda concentrate in low-tax countries, as I discuss in the column. Coca-Cola paid a combined tax rate of 15.25 percent between 2007 and 2012, while PepsiCo paid 21.31 percent.

The companies chose not to discuss their tax strategies in detail with me, but each did issue a statement in response to my questions.

From Amanda Rosseter, a Coca-Cola spokeswoman:

The Coca-Cola Company is a compliant taxpayer globally, paying all legally required income taxes in the U.S. and every country in which our subsidiaries operate.

As a global company with products sold in more than 200 countries, more than 80% of our unit case volume is sold outside the United States. The fact that our effective tax rate is lower than some other companies in the S.&P. 500 is reflective of the fact that less than 20% of our volume comes from sales in the U.S., which has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world.

From Aurora Gonzalez, a PepsiCo spokeswoman:

We cannot comment on the tax rates of other companies or industries. PepsiCo's tax rate is driven by the tax laws and regulations of the approximately 200 countries and territories in which we do business, and we pay all of our tax obligations in full.



Let Them Make Their Own Jobs

Nancy Folbre, economist at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Nancy Folbre is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Legend has it that Marie Antoinette, told of Parisians protesting the shortage of bread, impatiently exclaimed, “Let them eat cake.”

American Express's chief executive, Kenneth I. Chenault, adopted a kinder tone in his commencement speech this year at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, but offered a similar message. Acknowledging that jobs are hard to find, he emphasized that new technology makes it easier to invent them.

Yes, and the price of cake may have fallen relative to bread, but that is slim consolation to college graduates who face weak demand for their hard-won skills either as workers or entrepreneurs. Their new diplomas may send them to the front of the employment line, but the jobs they find there don't offer as much money or career potential as before.

A recent report from the Economic Policy Institute estimates that the inflation-adjusted wages of young college graduates declined 8.5 percent from 2000 to 2012. Graduating in a poor job market has long-lasting negative consequences.

Such lemony facts can be turned into lemonade and sold by the side of the road. The business news media brims with celebration of millennial entrepreneurship and the rise of freedom-seeking freelancers.

But entrepreneurship goes up with joblessness partly because it just sounds so much more hopeful. It also looks better on a résumé, since reported spells of unemployment reduce job chances.

Largely as a result of “jobless” or “unintended” entrepreneurship, the number of individuals starting businesses increased in recent years. But the number bailing out grew even faster. The Great Recession reduced self-employment over all because sole proprietorships and small businesses were so hard hit by the downturn.

Scott Shane, professor of management at Case Western Reserve University, points out that the median family incomes of the self-employed declined sharply relative to others from 2007 to 2009.

He also emphasizes that start-ups are not revitalizing the United States labor market. The number of people employed in one-year-old businesses declined by half from 1990 to 2010.

“Despite the claim that recessions are a time of opportunity for entrepreneurs,” he explains, “the Great Recession had a negative impact on U.S. entrepreneurship.” The same can be said of the Not-So-Great Recovery.

In 2012, the number of venture capital deals was substantially lower than in 2007. The total amount of venture capital investment declined as well, to about 75 percent (in inflation-adjusted terms) of that in the earlier year.

A recent Congressional Budget Office report shows that small and medium-size companies had disproportionately greater job losses than large companies in recent years. The latest Intuit Small Business Employment Index registers levels far below that of 2007.

These trends show that employment and entrepreneurship aren't substitutes but complements.

The same factors that are hurting the job market are making it hard for start-ups and small businesses to succeed: consumers aren't spending enough money to create an expansion on their own, and austerity-driven cuts in government spending are weakening economic growth.

As Heidi Shierholz of the Economic Policy Institute puts it, the declining prospects of young college graduates are clearly the result of “a demand problem, not a skills problem.”

Individual effort and ingenuity can't guarantee success in either finding or inventing jobs.

Our national problem may be that we assume entrepreneurs are superheroes who can leap over macroeconomic constraints in a single bound, especially if liberated from the villainous clutches of government.

But entrepreneurs can be crippled by a shortfall of demand for the goods and services they offer. And like the rest of us, they need bread, or at least cake, to survive.



Saturday, May 25, 2013

Untangling What Companies Pay in Taxes

The tax filings of companies, like those of individuals, are confidential. When individual companies want to make the case that they pay large amounts of tax - as many do - they often point to complex calculations from their financial statements that portray the companies in the best light. For an outsider, it can be hard to know how many accounting assumptions go into these calculations and how accurately they reflect the company’s actual tax payments.

But there is one standardized measure of corporate taxes that allows for meaningful comparisons among companies and industries. It is known as Cash Taxes Paid and appears in the public reports that companies are required to file for investors. The category reflects the combined amount of corporate income tax that a company pays in a given year, to foreign governments, the United States government and state and local governments.

This number often varies significantly from year to year, depending on a company’s accounting strategy and on how many tax breaks it qualifies for that year. As a result, a single year’s Cash Taxes Paid number can be misleading. But in a 2008 academic paper, three accounting professors â€" Scott Dyreng of Duke, Michelle Hanlon of M.I.T. and Edward Maydew of the University of North Carolina â€" suggested that looking at several years, at least, could offer insight into corporate taxes.

For a column for the Sunday Review this week, I asked S&P Capital IQ, a financial research group, to collect the last six fiscal years of Cash Taxes Paid for the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index. Capital IQ then compared these numbers to the companies’ pretax earnings, including unusual items, for the same six years. Together, the two statistics create an effective tax rate for each company, as well for various industries.

The numbers show that oil companies and retailers pay relatively high tax rates, as you can see in this chart. Technology companies, pharmaceutical companies and utilities have lower-than-average tax rates. In all, the average rate for the S.&P. 500 was 29.1 percent over last six years.

The number helps make clear that despite a relatively high official corporate income-tax rate of 35 percent in the United States, most companies do not pay nearly that much, thanks to loopholes. Remember: the 29.1 percent includes not only federal corporate income taxes but also foreign, state and local.

Soft-drink companies are among those paying taxes well below average, partly because of their ability to locate the manufacturing plants for soda concentrate in low-tax countries, as I discuss in the column. Coca-Cola paid a combined tax rate of 15.25 percent between 2007 and 2012, while PepsiCo paid 21.31 percent.

The companies chose not to discuss their tax strategies in detail with me, but each did issue a statement in response to my questions.

From Amanda Rosseter, a Coca-Cola spokeswoman:

The Coca-Cola Company is a compliant taxpayer globally, paying all legally required income taxes in the U.S. and every country in which our subsidiaries operate.

As a global company with products sold in more than 200 countries, more than 80% of our unit case volume is sold outside the United States. The fact that our effective tax rate is lower than some other companies in the S.&P. 500 is reflective of the fact that less than 20% of our volume comes from sales in the U.S., which has one of the highest corporate tax rates in the world.

From Aurora Gonzalez, a PepsiCo spokeswoman:

We cannot comment on the tax rates of other companies or industries. PepsiCo’s tax rate is driven by the tax laws and regulations of the approximately 200 countries and territories in which we do business, and we pay all of our tax obligations in full.



The Changing Face of Community Colleges

Students at community colleges increasingly come from low-income families, as I mention in an article for Thursday's newspaper about a new report. The trends, in their simplest terms:

Source: Anthony P. Carnevale and Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access Is Increasing Inequality, and What to Do About It, in Source: Anthony P. Carnevale and Jeff Strohl, “How Increasing College Access Is Increasing Inequality, and What to Do About It,” in “Rewarding Strivers: Helping Low-Income Students Succeed in College,” ed. Richard D. Kahlenberg (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2010), 136â€"37, Figures 3.6 and 3.7.

The ethnic breakdown has also changed, as the report, which is being published by The Century Foundation, explains:

Between 1994 and 2006, the white share of the community college population plummeted from 73 percent to 58 percent, while black and Hispanic representation grew from 21 percent to 33 percent, in part reflecting growing diversity in the population as a whole. By contrast, the change was much less dramatic at the most selective four-year colleges during this time period, when the white share dipped just three percentage points (from 78 percent to 75 percent) and the black and Hispanic shares barely moved (from 11 percent to 12 percent).

Community colleges get much less media attention than four-year colleges - and I'll plead guilty to that charge, too - but they will play an enormous role in shaping the economy. They enroll more than 40 percent of college students nationwide. They also tend to have distressingly low graduation rates, which means they represent a pool of potential college graduates.

As we have written before, the unemployment rate for college graduates is below 4 percent. For everyone else, it is above 7.5 percent.

The full report on community colleges, from the Century Foundation, is now online.



Debating Doctors\' Compensation

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Two themes run through the comments on previous blog posts that touched on the payment of the providers of health care. The first is that American doctors are paid too much. The second is that they are paid too little.

Could both propositions be right? Let us explore the issue by looking at some numbers.

Figure 1, below, presents data on the median compensation reported by the American Medical Group Association for 2011. (The report shows data for many more specialties than can be shown in the chart.)

American Medical Group Association


The American Medical Group Association is the national association of more than 130,000 doctors practicing in large medical specialty groups. Its data are very close to the median compensation data for doctors reported by the professional group-practice administrations represented by the national Medical Group Management Association.

As is regularly reported by the trade journal Modern Healthcare, data on median or average doctors compensation can vary significantly, depending on who does the survey, the sample they survey and the response rates they achieve (you can see this by clicking on the chart to the right of the headline on this page). I personally view the American Group Medical Association and the Medical Group Management Group data as the most reliable.

As we saw in Figure 1, the median compensation of doctors varies considerably among medical specialties in any given year. There is also a wide dispersion of compensation figures about the median for any given specialty, as is shown in Table 1. These data came from the previously cited American Medical Group Association survey.

American Medical Group Association

The dispersion of doctor  incomes is apt to be even wider if one includes not only physicians practicing in large medical groups but all practicing doctors.

Depending on their specialty, age, gender, whether they practice individually, in small groups or large groups and, most importantly, where they practice, a good many American doctors â€" especially primary-care physicians - probably do struggle to meet payroll, other practice costs and malpractice premiums and still have enough net income to support a family. This is especially so because as self-employed business professionals they do not get the fringe benefits available in formal employment in larger firms, and a good number of them have to repay principal and interest on educational debt that now averages $150,000 or so by the time residency training is over.

Over the last decade, the net incomes especially of primary-care doctors have hardly grown at all and even declined somewhat in inflation-adjusted dollars.

On the other hand, we read in the press that medical professionals are well represented in the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States. The ABA Journal of the American Bar Association reports that doctors outrank lawyers in that lofty cohort.

It should be noted, however, that one's income does not have to be astronomical to rank among the top 1 percent of earners. A report on Bankrate.com noted that according to a model run by the Tax Policy Center and the Urban Institute, an income above $533,000 put one into the top 1 percent of earners in 2011.

So, what is one to make of these data on doctor incomes?

Are American doctors overpaid, as is sometimes argued, often with reference to physician incomes in other countries?

Or are American doctors underpaid, as about half of the physicians seem to think?

On this question, one can entertain several theories.

Standard economic theory suggests that over all, American doctors are overpaid, although perhaps not the primary-care specialties. This position leans on the fact that at existing incomes there is still considerable excess demand for places in medical schools among bright American youngsters â€" not to mention a huge pool of highly qualified foreign applicants. This suggests that the lamented doctor shortage in the United States is the result of an artificially constrained supply of medical school places and residency slots, which serves to inflate physician incomes above what they would be in a better functioning market without supply constraints.

As noted earlier, the idea that American doctors seem overpaid is often supported also with reference to what physicians in other countries are paid. Dana Goldman, an economist at the University of Southern California, for example, was quoted to that effect in an article in The New York Times.

My own view is that if one wants to go down that line of argument, the relevant comparison should not be doctors in other countries, but the incomes earned in the United States by members of the talent pool from which American physicians are recruited, a group that includes many who end up in the superbly well-remunerated financial markets, where they are well paid almost independently of their actual net contribution to society.

This position draws on the comparable-worth theory of compensation.

One can cite work by Christopher Conover of Duke University, who has estimated that the rate of return on the investment in human capital (i.e., education and training) to become a doctor is attractive â€" especially for the higher-paying medical specialties â€" but it is not as high as the rate earned on human-capital investments for other professions.

That finding, however, does not speak directly to the issue whether on average American physicians are over- or underpaid.

When in doubt, it may be wise to turn to the father of modern economics, Adam Smith. In “The Wealth of Nations” (published in 1776) he opined in Chapter 10:

We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labor.

So when it came to contemplating the payment of doctors, Smith seems to have checked in his favored demand-and-supply framework at the door and slouched toward the medieval doctrine of just price. In my weaker moment, I slouch that way, too, as, I suspect, do many other economists, although my sentiment in this regard stops short of “lawyers and attorneys.”



Thursday, May 23, 2013

Debating Doctors’ Compensation

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Two themes run through the comments on previous blog posts that touched on the payment of the providers of health care. The first is that American doctors are paid too much. The second is that they are paid too little.

Could both propositions be right? Let us explore the issue by looking at some numbers.

Figure 1, below, presents data on the median compensation reported by the American Medical Group Association for 2011. (The report shows data for many more specialties than can be shown in the chart.)

American Medical Group Association


The American Medical Group Association is the national association of more than 130,000 doctors practicing in large medical specialty groups. Its data are very close to the median compensation data for doctors reported by the professional group-practice administrations represented by the national Medical Group Management Association.

As is regularly reported by the trade journal Modern Healthcare, data on median or average doctors compensation can vary significantly, depending on who does the survey, the sample they survey and the response rates they achieve (you can see this by clicking on the chart to the right of the headline on this page). I personally view the American Group Medical Association and the Medical Group Management Group data as the most reliable.

As we saw in Figure 1, the median compensation of doctors varies considerably among medical specialties in any given year. There is also a wide dispersion of compensation figures about the median for any given specialty, as is shown in Table 1. These data came from the previously cited American Medical Group Association survey.

American Medical Group Association

The dispersion of doctor  incomes is apt to be even wider if one includes not only physicians practicing in large medical groups but all practicing doctors.

Depending on their specialty, age, gender, whether they practice individually, in small groups or large groups and, most importantly, where they practice, a good many American doctors - especially primary-care physicians â€" probably do struggle to meet payroll, other practice costs and malpractice premiums and still have enough net income to support a family. This is especially so because as self-employed business professionals they do not get the fringe benefits available in formal employment in larger firms, and a good number of them have to repay principal and interest on educational debt that now averages $150,000 or so by the time residency training is over.

Over the last decade, the net incomes especially of primary-care doctors have hardly grown at all and even declined somewhat in inflation-adjusted dollars.

On the other hand, we read in the press that medical professionals are well represented in the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States. The ABA Journal of the American Bar Association reports that doctors outrank lawyers in that lofty cohort.

It should be noted, however, that one’s income does not have to be astronomical to rank among the top 1 percent of earners. A report on Bankrate.com noted that according to a model run by the Tax Policy Center and the Urban Institute, an income above $533,000 put one into the top 1 percent of earners in 2011.

So, what is one to make of these data on doctor incomes?

Are American doctors overpaid, as is sometimes argued, often with reference to physician incomes in other countries?

Or are American doctors underpaid, as about half of the physicians seem to think?

On this question, one can entertain several theories.

Standard economic theory suggests that over all, American doctors are overpaid, although perhaps not the primary-care specialties. This position leans on the fact that at existing incomes there is still considerable excess demand for places in medical schools among bright American youngsters - not to mention a huge pool of highly qualified foreign applicants. This suggests that the lamented doctor shortage in the United States is the result of an artificially constrained supply of medical school places and residency slots, which serves to inflate physician incomes above what they would be in a better functioning market without supply constraints.

As noted earlier, the idea that American doctors seem overpaid is often supported also with reference to what physicians in other countries are paid. Dana Goldman, an economist at the University of Southern California, for example, was quoted to that effect in an article in The New York Times.

My own view is that if one wants to go down that line of argument, the relevant comparison should not be doctors in other countries, but the incomes earned in the United States by members of the talent pool from which American physicians are recruited, a group that includes many who end up in the superbly well-remunerated financial markets, where they are well paid almost independently of their actual net contribution to society.

This position draws on the comparable-worth theory of compensation.

One can cite work by Christopher Conover of Duke University, who has estimated that the rate of return on the investment in human capital (i.e., education and training) to become a doctor is attractive - especially for the higher-paying medical specialties - but it is not as high as the rate earned on human-capital investments for other professions.

That finding, however, does not speak directly to the issue whether on average American physicians are over- or underpaid.

When in doubt, it may be wise to turn to the father of modern economics, Adam Smith. In “The Wealth of Nations” (published in 1776) he opined in Chapter 10:

We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labor.

So when it came to contemplating the payment of doctors, Smith seems to have checked in his favored demand-and-supply framework at the door and slouched toward the medieval doctrine of just price. In my weaker moment, I slouch that way, too, as, I suspect, do many other economists, although my sentiment in this regard stops short of “lawyers and attorneys.”



Debating Doctors’ Compensation

DESCRIPTION

Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

Two themes run through the comments on previous blog posts that touched on the payment of the providers of health care. The first is that American doctors are paid too much. The second is that they are paid too little.

Could both propositions be right? Let us explore the issue by looking at some numbers.

Figure 1, below, presents data on the median compensation reported by the American Medical Group Association for 2011. (The report shows data for many more specialties than can be shown in the chart.)

American Medical Group Association


The American Medical Group Association is the national association of more than 130,000 doctors practicing in large medical specialty groups. Its data are very close to the median compensation data for doctors reported by the professional group-practice administrations represented by the national Medical Group Management Association.

As is regularly reported by the trade journal Modern Healthcare, data on median or average doctors compensation can vary significantly, depending on who does the survey, the sample they survey and the response rates they achieve (you can see this by clicking on the chart to the right of the headline on this page). I personally view the American Group Medical Association and the Medical Group Management Group data as the most reliable.

As we saw in Figure 1, the median compensation of doctors varies considerably among medical specialties in any given year. There is also a wide dispersion of compensation figures about the median for any given specialty, as is shown in Table 1. These data came from the previously cited American Medical Group Association survey.

American Medical Group Association

The dispersion of doctor  incomes is apt to be even wider if one includes not only physicians practicing in large medical groups but all practicing doctors.

Depending on their specialty, age, gender, whether they practice individually, in small groups or large groups and, most importantly, where they practice, a good many American doctors - especially primary-care physicians â€" probably do struggle to meet payroll, other practice costs and malpractice premiums and still have enough net income to support a family. This is especially so because as self-employed business professionals they do not get the fringe benefits available in formal employment in larger firms, and a good number of them have to repay principal and interest on educational debt that now averages $150,000 or so by the time residency training is over.

Over the last decade, the net incomes especially of primary-care doctors have hardly grown at all and even declined somewhat in inflation-adjusted dollars.

On the other hand, we read in the press that medical professionals are well represented in the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States. The ABA Journal of the American Bar Association reports that doctors outrank lawyers in that lofty cohort.

It should be noted, however, that one’s income does not have to be astronomical to rank among the top 1 percent of earners. A report on Bankrate.com noted that according to a model run by the Tax Policy Center and the Urban Institute, an income above $533,000 put one into the top 1 percent of earners in 2011.

So, what is one to make of these data on doctor incomes?

Are American doctors overpaid, as is sometimes argued, often with reference to physician incomes in other countries?

Or are American doctors underpaid, as about half of the physicians seem to think?

On this question, one can entertain several theories.

Standard economic theory suggests that over all, American doctors are overpaid, although perhaps not the primary-care specialties. This position leans on the fact that at existing incomes there is still considerable excess demand for places in medical schools among bright American youngsters - not to mention a huge pool of highly qualified foreign applicants. This suggests that the lamented doctor shortage in the United States is the result of an artificially constrained supply of medical school places and residency slots, which serves to inflate physician incomes above what they would be in a better functioning market without supply constraints.

As noted earlier, the idea that American doctors seem overpaid is often supported also with reference to what physicians in other countries are paid. Dana Goldman, an economist at the University of Southern California, for example, was quoted to that effect in an article in The New York Times.

My own view is that if one wants to go down that line of argument, the relevant comparison should not be doctors in other countries, but the incomes earned in the United States by members of the talent pool from which American physicians are recruited, a group that includes many who end up in the superbly well-remunerated financial markets, where they are well paid almost independently of their actual net contribution to society.

This position draws on the comparable-worth theory of compensation.

One can cite work by Christopher Conover of Duke University, who has estimated that the rate of return on the investment in human capital (i.e., education and training) to become a doctor is attractive - especially for the higher-paying medical specialties - but it is not as high as the rate earned on human-capital investments for other professions.

That finding, however, does not speak directly to the issue whether on average American physicians are over- or underpaid.

When in doubt, it may be wise to turn to the father of modern economics, Adam Smith. In “The Wealth of Nations” (published in 1776) he opined in Chapter 10:

We trust our health to the physician; our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Such confidence could not safely be reposed in people of a very mean or low condition. Their reward must be such, therefore, as may give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. The long time and the great expense which must be laid out in their education, when combined with this circumstance, necessarily enhance still further the price of their labor.

So when it came to contemplating the payment of doctors, Smith seems to have checked in his favored demand-and-supply framework at the door and slouched toward the medieval doctrine of just price. In my weaker moment, I slouch that way, too, as, I suspect, do many other economists, although my sentiment in this regard stops short of “lawyers and attorneys.”