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Wednesday, July 31, 2013

Sadly, Too Big to Fail Is Not Over

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

Writing in Politico earlier this week, former Senator Chris Dodd and former Representative Barney Frank contend that the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation of 2010 ends forever the ability of the United States government to provide support to failing financial companies. “The Dodd-Frank Act is clear: Not only is there no legal authority to use public money to keep a failing entity in business, the law forbids it,” they write.

Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank worked long and hard on financial reform in 2009-10, and there is much in their bill that is helpful, which is why regulators need to pick up the pace on completing and putting in place genuinely strong rules. But on the bigger picture - whether too-big-to-fail financial institutions still benefit from implicit government subsidies and a high probability of explicit bailouts â€" I respectfully disagree with them. I’m not alone â€" in response to recent questioning from Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, confirmed that credit markets still believed the government stands behind big banks.

There are three issues: the powers of the Federal Reserve, the mandate of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the vulnerability of taxpayers when one or more large complex financial institutions fail. We have at least five such companies in the United States, all of which are intensely cross-border in their operations (in order of size, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).

On the mechanics of what the Fed is allowed to do, Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank are of course correct that their legislation changed the powers of the Federal Reserve. The precise legal authority that allowed a loan of $85 billion to American International Group in September 2008 no longer exists.

But as Marc Jarsulic and I explained in this space recently, the Federal Reserve still has plenty of other powers that can be invoked to provide support to failing financial companies. For example, the Taunus Corporation (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank) and perhaps others were saved in 2008 by lending programs that were made available to a broader group of companies or that covered an entire class of assets. Such programs are still legal.

Lending by the Fed to one specific company is more difficult to justify under current legislation. But the biggest and most leveraged financial companies in the United States today are all now bank-holding companies, with access to the discount window at the Fed, via their commercial banking subsidiaries.

Lending by the Fed to an insolvent company is also harder to justify - or, under some interpretations, not allowed. But you may have noticed that Wall Street executives and their friends now like to say, “No one was insolvent; there were just some liquidity problems.” In truth, major companies were insolvent (with their assets worth less than their liabilities), but if you thought the various forms of Federal Reserve support to the economy would work (supported by expansive fiscal policy and other actions), then the price of their assets could recover.

The same was true for many homeowners. They were under water on their mortgages in 2008, but with house prices rising now, were they insolvent or merely illiquid?

In any crisis, the people in power decide what to call a liquidity crisis and where to draw the line on helping those who are “insolvent” - and this remains true under Dodd-Frank. Bank executives do better than ordinary folks when those kinds of determinations are made.

About the mandate of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank stress that a failing institution should be taken over by the F.D.I.C. “to begin the process of liquidating the institution.” Again, they are correct that this would be likely to involve dismissing the board and perhaps some executives. There is “liquidation” in a legal sense; the company would no longer exist.

But the current plans of the F.D.I.C. do not call for the liquidation of the business as a going concern, although there are encouraging indications that failing institutions would be restructured and downsized. In fact, its approach calls for recapitalizing the holding company (by converting debt to equity) and using that new capital to support existing subsidiaries. The holding company’s legal identity would change and holders of bonds issued by that entity would incur losses, but existing contracts with creditors to the operating subsidiaries would remain in place - without any losses for those lenders.

The rationale is to avoid disruption in financial markets. But the result, as one leading Wall Street lawyer put it recently, is to create an extra level of protection for anyone entering into a swap agreement (or other transaction involving credit, implicitly or explicitly) with an operating subsidiary.

To be fair, the F.D.I.C.’s James Wigand said in recent Congressional testimony:

However, creditors at the subsidiary level should not assume that they avoid risk of loss. For example, if the losses at the financial company are so large that the holding company’s shareholders and creditors cannot absorb them, then the subsidiaries with the greatest losses will have to be placed into resolution, exposing those subsidiary creditors to loss.

I fully support the work of the F.D.I.C in this area and it was a good idea to put it in charge of resolution, but this is really a difficult task. (I’m a member of the F.D.I.C.’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, an unpaid position. I am not responsible for the F.D.I.C.’s plans and I write here in a purely personal capacity.)

My expectation is that, in this context, crucial employees would be kept on - just as they were at A.I.G. in fall 2008. And yes, if it was thought necessary for the well-functioning of the firm, they would get to keep their bonuses - just as people at A.I.G. Financial Products were allowed to do, even though their part of the company was responsible for the huge losses.

If you are a creditor, does lending to JPMorgan Chase or Goldman Sachs - in a derivative transaction with an operating subsidiary â€" look more or less risky with the F.D.I.C. arrangement in place? It looks less risky, hence there is a bigger pricing advantage for the megabanks (you are willing to lend to them at a cheaper rate because you are less likely to lose your money).

In principle, the F.D.I.C., Fed and Treasury have the power to force banks to have realistic self-insurance against losses by requiring a much higher level of equity finance, and to put in place living wills that make it easier to liquidate them under regular bankruptcy proceedings (without any government involvement). They and other regulators can also limit the risks these banks can take, including the Volcker Rule. Top officials could also force the biggest companies to become smaller, if they thought this reduced systemic risk in a significant way. In practice, none of this is really working three years after the passage of Dodd-Frank.

I share the view of Richard Fisher of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, who, speaking of too-big-to-fail institutions, said he did not “have much faith in the living will process to make any material difference in risks and behaviors â€" a bank would run out of liquidity (not capital) due to reputational risk quicker than management would work with regulators to execute a living will blueprint.” Mr. Fisher’s testimony to the House Financial Services Committee in June candidly suggested Dodd-Frank isn’t getting the job done. And Mr. Volcker recently said the foot-dragging on implementing his rule was disastrous.

More broadly, I would suggest it’s all pretty scary. Dodd-Frank has some tools that help reduce the problem of too big to fail, but none of this will help unless the supporting regulations are fully in place.

Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank stress that it is now much harder for taxpayer or “public money” to be used “to keep a highly indebted institution alive.” Perhaps, but the F.D.I.C. can guarantee the debt of distressed companies pretty much as it did in fall 2008. (For the details, again see my post with Mr. Jarsulic.) To be clear, the F.D.I.C. can guarantee the debt of a company that has been put into receivership, but it can no longer guarantee the debt of a company that remains open; that would require an act of Congress.

Additionally, the big potential future losses to taxpayers and to residents of the United States more broadly are from the contraction of credit and crash in the real economy when big banks get into trouble. There is nothing in the legislation that prevents the boom-bust of 2003-7 or mass unemployment on the scale of what happened in 2008 - which has persisted to today.

Responsible policy makers know this. When presented with the alternative of unsavory bailout or unprecedented economic collapse, which would you choose? And what would you like your Congress to do, at the spur of that moment?

George W. Bush and Henry Paulson, his Treasury secretary, were willing to open the public pocket to all of Wall Street, because they feared the alternative. What would any other president and his or her team decide to do?

Senator Dodd and Representative Frank did a great service with legislation that has the potential to become the basis for meaningful financial reform.

Unfortunately, their current message will encourage regulators to relax and Wall Street lobbyists to break out the Champagne.

As Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said recently, we should put all the provisions of the Dodd-Frank law into effect by the end of this year. And “if we get to the end of this year and we cannot, with an honest, straight face, say that we have ended too big to fail, we are going to have to look at other options,” he said.

As Mr. Lew stressed, “It’s unacceptable to be in a place where too big to fail has not been ended.” Sadly, that is where we are today.



Sadly, Too Big to Fail Is Not Over

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Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management and co-author of “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You.”

Writing in Politico earlier this week, former Senator Chris Dodd and former Representative Barney Frank contend that the Dodd-Frank financial reform legislation of 2010 ends forever the ability of the United States government to provide support to failing financial companies. “The Dodd-Frank Act is clear: Not only is there no legal authority to use public money to keep a failing entity in business, the law forbids it,” they write.

Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank worked long and hard on financial reform in 2009-10, and there is much in their bill that is helpful, which is why regulators need to pick up the pace on completing and putting in place genuinely strong rules. But on the bigger picture - whether too-big-to-fail financial institutions still benefit from implicit government subsidies and a high probability of explicit bailouts â€" I respectfully disagree with them. I’m not alone â€" in response to recent questioning from Senator Elizabeth Warren, Democrat of Massachusetts, the Federal Reserve chairman, Ben S. Bernanke, confirmed that credit markets still believed the government stands behind big banks.

There are three issues: the powers of the Federal Reserve, the mandate of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the vulnerability of taxpayers when one or more large complex financial institutions fail. We have at least five such companies in the United States, all of which are intensely cross-border in their operations (in order of size, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley).

On the mechanics of what the Fed is allowed to do, Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank are of course correct that their legislation changed the powers of the Federal Reserve. The precise legal authority that allowed a loan of $85 billion to American International Group in September 2008 no longer exists.

But as Marc Jarsulic and I explained in this space recently, the Federal Reserve still has plenty of other powers that can be invoked to provide support to failing financial companies. For example, the Taunus Corporation (a subsidiary of Deutsche Bank) and perhaps others were saved in 2008 by lending programs that were made available to a broader group of companies or that covered an entire class of assets. Such programs are still legal.

Lending by the Fed to one specific company is more difficult to justify under current legislation. But the biggest and most leveraged financial companies in the United States today are all now bank-holding companies, with access to the discount window at the Fed, via their commercial banking subsidiaries.

Lending by the Fed to an insolvent company is also harder to justify - or, under some interpretations, not allowed. But you may have noticed that Wall Street executives and their friends now like to say, “No one was insolvent; there were just some liquidity problems.” In truth, major companies were insolvent (with their assets worth less than their liabilities), but if you thought the various forms of Federal Reserve support to the economy would work (supported by expansive fiscal policy and other actions), then the price of their assets could recover.

The same was true for many homeowners. They were under water on their mortgages in 2008, but with house prices rising now, were they insolvent or merely illiquid?

In any crisis, the people in power decide what to call a liquidity crisis and where to draw the line on helping those who are “insolvent” - and this remains true under Dodd-Frank. Bank executives do better than ordinary folks when those kinds of determinations are made.

About the mandate of the Federal Reserve, Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank stress that a failing institution should be taken over by the F.D.I.C. “to begin the process of liquidating the institution.” Again, they are correct that this would be likely to involve dismissing the board and perhaps some executives. There is “liquidation” in a legal sense; the company would no longer exist.

But the current plans of the F.D.I.C. do not call for the liquidation of the business as a going concern, although there are encouraging indications that failing institutions would be restructured and downsized. In fact, its approach calls for recapitalizing the holding company (by converting debt to equity) and using that new capital to support existing subsidiaries. The holding company’s legal identity would change and holders of bonds issued by that entity would incur losses, but existing contracts with creditors to the operating subsidiaries would remain in place - without any losses for those lenders.

The rationale is to avoid disruption in financial markets. But the result, as one leading Wall Street lawyer put it recently, is to create an extra level of protection for anyone entering into a swap agreement (or other transaction involving credit, implicitly or explicitly) with an operating subsidiary.

To be fair, the F.D.I.C.’s James Wigand said in recent Congressional testimony:

However, creditors at the subsidiary level should not assume that they avoid risk of loss. For example, if the losses at the financial company are so large that the holding company’s shareholders and creditors cannot absorb them, then the subsidiaries with the greatest losses will have to be placed into resolution, exposing those subsidiary creditors to loss.

I fully support the work of the F.D.I.C in this area and it was a good idea to put it in charge of resolution, but this is really a difficult task. (I’m a member of the F.D.I.C.’s Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee, an unpaid position. I am not responsible for the F.D.I.C.’s plans and I write here in a purely personal capacity.)

My expectation is that, in this context, crucial employees would be kept on - just as they were at A.I.G. in fall 2008. And yes, if it was thought necessary for the well-functioning of the firm, they would get to keep their bonuses - just as people at A.I.G. Financial Products were allowed to do, even though their part of the company was responsible for the huge losses.

If you are a creditor, does lending to JPMorgan Chase or Goldman Sachs - in a derivative transaction with an operating subsidiary â€" look more or less risky with the F.D.I.C. arrangement in place? It looks less risky, hence there is a bigger pricing advantage for the megabanks (you are willing to lend to them at a cheaper rate because you are less likely to lose your money).

In principle, the F.D.I.C., Fed and Treasury have the power to force banks to have realistic self-insurance against losses by requiring a much higher level of equity finance, and to put in place living wills that make it easier to liquidate them under regular bankruptcy proceedings (without any government involvement). They and other regulators can also limit the risks these banks can take, including the Volcker Rule. Top officials could also force the biggest companies to become smaller, if they thought this reduced systemic risk in a significant way. In practice, none of this is really working three years after the passage of Dodd-Frank.

I share the view of Richard Fisher of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, who, speaking of too-big-to-fail institutions, said he did not “have much faith in the living will process to make any material difference in risks and behaviors â€" a bank would run out of liquidity (not capital) due to reputational risk quicker than management would work with regulators to execute a living will blueprint.” Mr. Fisher’s testimony to the House Financial Services Committee in June candidly suggested Dodd-Frank isn’t getting the job done. And Mr. Volcker recently said the foot-dragging on implementing his rule was disastrous.

More broadly, I would suggest it’s all pretty scary. Dodd-Frank has some tools that help reduce the problem of too big to fail, but none of this will help unless the supporting regulations are fully in place.

Mr. Dodd and Mr. Frank stress that it is now much harder for taxpayer or “public money” to be used “to keep a highly indebted institution alive.” Perhaps, but the F.D.I.C. can guarantee the debt of distressed companies pretty much as it did in fall 2008. (For the details, again see my post with Mr. Jarsulic.) To be clear, the F.D.I.C. can guarantee the debt of a company that has been put into receivership, but it can no longer guarantee the debt of a company that remains open; that would require an act of Congress.

Additionally, the big potential future losses to taxpayers and to residents of the United States more broadly are from the contraction of credit and crash in the real economy when big banks get into trouble. There is nothing in the legislation that prevents the boom-bust of 2003-7 or mass unemployment on the scale of what happened in 2008 - which has persisted to today.

Responsible policy makers know this. When presented with the alternative of unsavory bailout or unprecedented economic collapse, which would you choose? And what would you like your Congress to do, at the spur of that moment?

George W. Bush and Henry Paulson, his Treasury secretary, were willing to open the public pocket to all of Wall Street, because they feared the alternative. What would any other president and his or her team decide to do?

Senator Dodd and Representative Frank did a great service with legislation that has the potential to become the basis for meaningful financial reform.

Unfortunately, their current message will encourage regulators to relax and Wall Street lobbyists to break out the Champagne.

As Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said recently, we should put all the provisions of the Dodd-Frank law into effect by the end of this year. And “if we get to the end of this year and we cannot, with an honest, straight face, say that we have ended too big to fail, we are going to have to look at other options,” he said.

As Mr. Lew stressed, “It’s unacceptable to be in a place where too big to fail has not been ended.” Sadly, that is where we are today.



Consumer Spending and Growth: A Rejoinder

Jared Bernstein is a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

I see that I have “startled” Casey Mulligan with my post last week, which he has addressed in an interesting post. He contends that contrary to my assertion that there are times when inequality damps middle-class consumer spending at the expense of aggregate growth, it is only investment, never consumption, that determines growth of gross domestic product.

Professor Mulligan writes, “High levels of consumer spending are a consequence of economic growth, not a cause of it.”

Well, sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t.

I actually tried to be more nuanced in my piece than Professor Mulligan’s critique suggests. I wrote (the important distinction is now in bold):

My point is that the inequality affects growth through many channels. In demand-constrained periods like the present, it weakens consumer spending and growth because the small share of beneficiaries of what growth there is have lower consumption propensities than everybody else. But in debt-driven expansions, inequality appears to play an integral role in terribly damaging bubbles inflated by stagnant incomes, underpriced risk and leveraged consumption.

Note that in the debt-driven case, I offer what I think is pretty interesting evidence of inequality interacting with the debt bubble in ways that actually increased middle-class spending.

So let’s review where Professor Mulligan and I agree and disagree. I’m totally with him on the importance of investment and innovation as fuel for growth, though here, too - as he himself notes - we should be concerned by recent research building compelling and troubling linkages between inequality and inadequate investments in lower-income children.

Where we disagree is how the normal growth dynamics change when the economy is operating with excess slack, particularly in the job market, i.e., times like now. In that case, it is widely accepted - in fact, it’s standard issue in all the economics textbooks Professor Mulligan cites - that Keynesian stimulus can lead to faster growth than would otherwise occur, much of which occurs through more consumer spending, and particularly spending by those on the have-not side of the inequality divide.

As the Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz wrote recently about the reasons inequality is impeding an economic recovery:

The most immediate is that our middle class is too weak to support the consumer spending that has historically driven our economic growth. While the top 1 percent of income earners took home 93 percent of the growth in incomes in 2010, the households in the middle - who are most likely to spend their incomes rather than save them and who are, in a sense, the true job creators - have lower household incomes, adjusted for inflation, than they did in 1996.

This is not complicated. All you have to believe is the following:

¶There are people who want to work more but can’t find either jobs or the hours of work they seek; in fact, there are more than 20 million people (over 14 percent) in the current work force who are involuntarily un- or underemployed.

¶Many of them are income-constrained; as per Professor Stiglitz, if they had more income they would spend it. Though the economy has expanded since the second half of 2009, real median household income is down 4.4 percent.The inflation-adjusted stock market is up 60 percent and corporate profits are at a record high relative to national income, so there’s your inequality: the economy’s growing but it’s not reaching the middle on down.

¶If less inequality - or stimulative fiscal or monetary policy - steered more growth to lower-income households, they’d be more likely to spend the extra dollar than a non-income-constrained rich family (see the statistics on this in my earlier post). That’s certainly what the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office believes (see Table 2) as it applies a G.D.P. growth multiplier that’s more than three times larger for transfer payments to those with lower incomes than tax cuts for the wealthy.

Most economists would consider that logic and evidence a slam dunk linking spending to growth during periods like the present, when high inequality and high unemployment are steering growth away from those with higher consumption propensities. There’s even evidence that investment follows consumer spending at times like this, as companies and their investors need to see customers before they undertake projects, even as interest rates have been historically low (it’s not a coincidence that in the current economy we have both weak demand and corporations that are sitting on large stores of investment capital).

But what about in normal periods when the economy is not demand-constrained? Here Professor Mulligan is on more mainstream ground. When we’re at full employment, most economists would agree that there’s no reason to try to boost one group’s consumption over that of another. There’s no “middle-out growth” in normal times. There’s just growth.

He may be right, but the problem is this: for most of the last few decades - two-thirds of the time by my count - we haven’t been at full employment. There’s been too much slack in the job market, and that may well make the middle-out story operative beyond times like the present.

Finally, and here again Professor Mulligan and I might agree, as I elaborated in my post, that too much inequality leads to financial instability, which is obviously bad for consumption, investment and growth.



A Not-So-Great Great Recession

The Great Recession was not as bad as we thought, and the recovery since then has been a little better than we thought.

That’s one of the implications of the Commerce Department’s extensive gross domestic product revisions released on Wednesday.

The department released revisions going all the way back to 1929, partly reflecting changes in methodology for how the gross domestic product and its components are calculated. For example, there’s now a new category of investment, called “intellectual property products,” which covers research and development; entertainment, literary, and artistic originals; and software.

As a result of all these changes, economic growth since 1929 has actually been a wee bit stronger than previously calculated: the average annual growth rate of inflation-adjusted growth was 3.3 percent, which is 0.1 percentage point higher than in the previously published estimates.

That’s the long-term picture. The Great Recession (which lasted from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009) also looks less formidable, at least in output terms. In the latest measures, inflation-adjusted growth decreased at an annual rate of 2.9 percent during that time, instead of the previously reported 3.2 percent. And the cumulative peak-to-trough contraction in the economy was 4.3 percent, rather than 4.7 percent.

Source: Commerce Department. Source: Commerce Department.

Likewise the recovery has looked slightly less lackluster than originally estimated. From the second quarter of 2009 to the first quarter of 2013, gross domestic product increased at a 2.2 percent annual rate; in the previously published estimates, it increased 2.1 percent.

For more on the statistical whiplash that major output revisions can cause, see a 2011 article from my colleague Binyamin Appelbaum.



Tuesday, July 30, 2013

Consumer Spending and Economic Growth

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

High levels of consumer spending are a consequence of economic growth, not a cause of it.

Perhaps the most important topic in economics is the determinants of sustained growth for an economy. The arithmetic of compound interest tells us that even a small addition to the annual economic growth rate creates huge improvements in living standards for subsequent generations.

Economists have been investigating the determinants of economic growth for decades, and conclude that investment is crucial for an economy to grow. High rates of investment in the present make possible future consumer spending. The debate continues as to the type of investment that is most important, and whether specific types of investment might be counterproductive (think of Stalin’s five-year plans).

A number of economists have emphasized physical investment: that is, the accumulation of structures, business plant and equipment and other tangible assets. J. Bradford De Long and Lawrence H. Summers found that “machinery and equipment investment has a strong association with growth,” adding that it was “much stronger than found between growth and any of the other components of investment.” (see also this paper in The Quarterly Journal of Economics by N. Gregory Mankiw, David Romer and David N. Weil)

Other economists, including Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker, have emphasized the accumulation of human capital through schooling and other kinds of training and learning. Arguably even machinery and equipment investment is not possible or effective unless the work force is skilled enough to install and use the new equipment.

A third school of thought points to investment in ideas and new technologies that outlast their inventors (the economist Paul Romer has made some major contributions here). This approach tends to be pro-population and pro-city, because ideas and technologies have economies of scale.

Economists are also unsure about the public policies that might promote investment. Should college educations get heavy subsidies? Should government enterprises be doing the basic research? Should tax rates on capital income be low? Should the financial industry be regulated?

But we do largely agree that investment, rather than consumer spending, is the means to achieving the high growth. High growth can sustain consumer spending in the future.

That’s why I was startled to see my fellow Economix blogger Jared Bernstein assert exactly the opposite. In supporting President Obama’s economics speech, Mr. Bernstein (who served in the Obama administration) contends that buying power for the middle class is essential for economic growth, because those people have a high “marginal propensity to consume” rather than invest and save.

I can see how supporting the middle class might enhance growth by helping parents afford to educate their children or altering the political climate in a way that better supported pro-investment policies. Or maybe now is the time for temporary stimulus rather than pro-growth policies. But that’s not what Mr. Bernstein wrote. He contended that, according to “solid theory,” middle-class “buying power” is critical for growth because the middle class is a segment of society that is unlikely to put its income toward saving and investment.

Mr. Bernstein has growth theory backward. But just in case he and President Obama have been following the latest economic growth theory more closely than I have, I went back to check the economic growth textbooks. My favorite was written by Robert Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin; I also looked at the latest editions of three books recommended by Tyler Cowen of George Mason University.

All of the books look closely at investment. All of them note the three flavors of investments: physical, human and ideas. None of them say that a high marginal propensity to consume might be a way to create sustained economic growth. None of them even has an entry in its index for “marginal propensity to consume” or any related concept (Professors Barro and Sala-i-Martin note that consumption is a function of wealth, and in doing so they show how investment rather than consumption leads to economic growth).

Mr. Bernstein emphasizes that “consumer spending as a share of gross domestic product in the United States is about 70 percent,” but that’s a red herring, because the models of investment and growth also assume the same fact. Economists understand that measuring the largest component of aggregate spending does not tell us whether growth is created by investment or consumer spending.

Philippe Aghion’s and Peter Howitt’s textbook has an extensive treatment of public policies that might promote economic growth, yet neither this nor the others mentioned above include Mr. Bernstein’s recommendation of shifting resources to persons with a high propensity to consume. Instead, the Aghion-Howitt book discusses “fostering competition and entry,” “investing in education,” “reducing volatility and risk,” “liberalizing trade,” “preserving the environment” and “promoting democracy.” (The authors do not necessarily conclude that each of these policies is a good idea, but merely explain how economic theory might link the policies to growth.)

Economic growth begins with investment and ends with consumer spending. Not the other way around. To the degree that policy makers are confused on this point, it should be no surprise that they are delivering low economic growth rates.



A Spurned Offer on Corporate Taxes

Jared Bernstein is a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

Given today’s political climate, one should not be surprised by senseless opposition to good ideas, but I must say I was a bit stunned by the Republican response to President Obama’s proposal to trade a corporate tax cut for a small jobs package.

I choose the word “good” above carefully to mean an idea that is designed to appeal to Republicans who have long been clamoring for a corporate rate cut.  At this point, if the president came out in favor of breathing, they’d tell their caucus members to hold their breaths.

A bit of background: President Obama is announcing a plan Tuesday to lower the corporate tax rate to 28 percent from 35 percent. The proposal is “revenue-neutral,” meaning that even though the rate comes down, the amount of revenue collected will not change, because of a broader tax base.  This is a common feature in tax reform proposals: you pay for a lower rate by closing loopholes and special breaks for various industries, breaks with which the corporate tax code is, of course, ripe.

Now, here’s an interesting, albeit weedy, wrinkle.  Some of the revenues you get from the base broadening are one-hit wonders: the Treasury gets a lift from a transition from one tax structure to another, but it’s not the kind of revenue stream you can count on in later years.  The smart thing to do in that situation is thus not to count on those revenues for the future but to do something useful with them now.

For example, you can pay the bill on a temporary jobs package that includes infrastructure projects, school modernization, support for new innovation in manufacturing and worker training through community colleges. These ideas look to me to have also been chosen, if not to appease the Republicans, then not to provoke knee-jerk opposition, as would have been the case if the White House said, for example, “New jobs for teachers!”

So, reviewing: we’ve got a big drop in the corporate rate that doesn’t add to the deficit, for which the Republicans have only to swallow a paid-for jobs program in areas they’ve historically supported.  And what’s the response?

From the spokesman for the House speaker, Representative John Boehner: “This proposal allows President Obama to support President Obama’s position on taxes and President Obama’s position on spending, while leaving small businesses and American families behind.”

I know, we’re in an upside-down world, but given how hard Republicans have fought for a lower corporate rate, the absence of accountability is particularly striking in this example.  At this point, I truly wonder that if he finally gave in and offered to repeal Obamacare, they’d fight to implement it tomorrow.

The other line of Republican attack is that the idea will hurt small businesses. Not only is there no evidence of that, but part of the plan is actually to allow small business an immediate write-off of 100 percent of the costs of new equipment, up to $1 million. That gives small businesses an incentive to invest, and lowers, not raises, the taxes of those who do so.

Let me be clear: I’m not 100 percent happy with this deal.  I firmly believe that corporate tax reform should be revenue-positive, not neutral.  The corporate sector is contributing historically little to our revenue base, and I see little reason to lock that in. But from the Republicans’ perspective, that’s a feature, not a bug.

Finally, some in the opposition are criticizing the deal because they want a full package that combines reform of both the corporate and individual sides of the code.  Well, I’d like to dunk like LeBron James, but it’s not going to happen, especially with Republicans as dug in as they are on no-new-revenues (not sure what that has to do with my basketball skills, but you get it).

This is a good deal for them, and given how wrenchingly tough the politics are right now, and how much the jobless need the help, it is a compromise that even revenue-positive folks like myself should accept. That it appears to be facing the same blockade as everything else gives you a sense of Washington’s dysfunction.



Mobility in Red and Blue States

David Leonhardt writes on The Caucus about a recent study that found the odds of escaping poverty are nearly identical in liberal and conservative regions.

Monday, July 29, 2013

The Question of Taxing Employer-Provided Health Insurance

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Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of the forthcoming book “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform - Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

The Senate Finance Committee recently committed itself to a zero-based approach to tax reform. All tax expenditures - special provisions that reduce taxes - will be deemed expendable unless senators speak up in support of them.

I am dubious about the value of this approach but nevertheless think it is useful to re-examine the origins and operation of major tax expenditures, many of which were adopted on the fly, with little thought to their long-run implications. Today I want to begin a series of posts on major tax expenditures, starting with the largest one.

The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is far and away the largest tax expenditure. In part this is because it, like all such exclusions, reduces payroll taxes as well as income taxes; it is as if the worker never received the income it represents, although employers may deduct the cost of health insurance as a business expense. In contrast to exclusions, individuals’ tax deductions, exemptions and credits reduce only income taxes.

According to the Congressional Budget Office, the health insurance exclusion will reduce federal revenue by $248 billion this year, including lost income and payroll taxes. That is equal to 1.5 percent of the gross domestic product - more than the federal government spends for interest on the public debt.

Section 213(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided that benefits received from health insurance were not considered to be part of gross income for tax purposes. This tax provision was not significant at the time, however, because health insurance was rare, in part because the cost of medicine was low.

According to the Miami University economist Melissa Thomasson, before the 1920s, medical technology was primitive, few drugs were available and hospitalization was rare. The main cost of illness was the income lost from not being able to work.

On the eve of World War II, just 1.3 million people had hospital insurance in a population of 130 million people. During the war, the federal government established wage and price controls to contain inflation. But the demand for war materiel and the military draft created a labor shortage, and businesses looked for ways to compete for the limited supply of workers without being able to raise wages.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Oct. 3, 1942, executive order freezing wages provided an exception for insurance and pension benefits. Employers began offering such benefits as a de facto way of paying higher wages without violating the controls. In 1943, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that employer-provided health insurance was not taxable to the employee.

This ruling was significant, because on the eve of the war only about 3 percent of the population paid federal income taxes; by the end of the war, this percentage had risen to 30 percent. There were fewer than four million taxable returns filed in 1939; by 1943, there were 40 million. Consequently, average Americans were suddenly in need of tax shelters and the exclusion for health insurance was very popular, leading to an expansion of health insurance coverage. By 1945, 32 million people had such benefits, according to Professor Thomasson.

In 1953, the I.R.S. briefly reversed itself and ruled that health insurance benefits were in fact taxable. The following year, however, Congress made the exclusion for health insurance part of the law. This and the continuation of wartime tax rates throughout the 1950s led to a further expansion of health insurance. By 1960, more than two-thirds of the population was covered: 122 million Americans in a population of 179 million.

In the 1970s, many economists such as Martin Feldstein of Harvard became concerned that the unlimited exclusion for health insurance was causing workers to demand excessive health benefits. Instead of providing protection for unforeseen events, analogous to fires in the case of homeowners’ insurance or accidents in the case of auto insurance, health insurance covered normal doctors’ visits, drugs and other predictable medical expenses.

In effect, people were paying for ordinary consumption with before-tax dollars. It was as if one’s auto insurance covered not only accidents but routine maintenance and gasoline as well.

Economists contended that overbuying health insurance fueled medical cost inflation, which raised health insurance premiums, which drove up the cost of employee compensation while pushing down cash wages.

In 1985, the Reagan administration proposed requiring workers to pay taxes on some health insurance benefits as part of tax reform. But the idea went nowhere in Congress.

In 2008, the Republican presidential nominee, Senator John McCain of Arizona, put forward an intriguing proposal to abolish the exclusion for health insurance and use the revenue to finance a $5,000 tax credit for families to buy their own health insurance.

One highly desirable result would have been to delink health insurance from employment, which would improve labor mobility and aid small businesses that are less likely to be able to afford health insurance than large companies, as well as aiding part-time workers and others who tend to lack employer-provided health insurance. The proposal would also have improved fairness because the tax benefits would be the same regardless of one’s income or tax bracket.

Unfortunately, Congress took the idea of abolishing the health insurance exclusion off the table early in the health reform debate in 2009. Also, Republicans made a partisan political decision to abandon the McCain plan, not offer any alternative to the Affordable Care Act and simply oppose whatever Democrats supported.

While it would be a good idea to revisit the exclusion for employer-provided health insurance in the context of tax reform, the likelihood that Congress will do so is small. Democrats have no appetite for reopening debate on the Affordable Care Act and Republicans still have nothing to replace it with.

More importantly, the exclusion remains highly popular. A July 22 United Technologies/National Journal poll found that 59 percent of Americans believe it is very important to keep it and another 29 percent say it is somewhat important; just 9 percent of people say it is not important.



Sunday, July 28, 2013

Fast Food Versus Slow Food

Nancy Folbre, economist at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Nancy Folbre is an economics professor at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst.

Never before have so many Americans watched so many entertaining cooking shows on television and enjoyed so much excellent food writing. Never before have so many spent so little time cooking food.

This paradox of modern life invites consideration of some of the good old-fashioned home economics pioneered by the economists Margaret Reid and Hazel Kyrk in the 1930s. Both predicted that the increasing value of time and powerful economies of scale would lead to increased substitution of market purchases for home-produced goods and services. Both also warned of limits to such substitutability.

Neither foresaw the extent to which the traditional housewife would be simultaneously liberated from and rendered obsolete in the kitchen. Average time per day devoted to cooking declined by 30 minutes between 1965 and 2007-08, a span of time for which detailed survey data are available.

Purchases of food away from home, expanding to 49 percent in 2011 from about 30 percent of all food dollars in 1965, and were a driving force behind this trend.

Also important was a shift toward purchases of prepared food, adding a range of choices such as frozen Asian cuisine to the classic TV dinner.

New household gadgets, including the now ubiquitous microwave oven, made it easier to defrost and reheat prepared foods. Indeed, the word “cooking” itself has become anachronistic. The American Time Use Survey first administered in 2003 categorizes the activity in broader, more generic terms as “food preparation and cleanup.” In 2012, only 40 percent of men and 65 percent of women ages 15 and over engaged in that activity a day. On average, men spent 0.7 hours on food preparation and cleanup while women spent 1.2 hours on it.

In other words, women still do far more of it than men, but it consumes a relatively small portion of their total work day.

Changes in the relative productivity of paid and unpaid work were a driving force behind this transformation. As women’s opportunities for employment outside the home grew, the opportunity cost of their time increased. As it became cheaper to purchase than to prepare food, women could contribute more to family living standards by finding paid employment.

Declining household size - and a growing tendency for people to live alone - also increased the relative cost of home cooking, because it reduced economies of scale in home food preparation.

By way of making this argument less abstract, a University of Massachusetts student and I conducted a small experiment. We compared the cost of buying a premium cheeseburger at a local fast-food restaurant with the cost of buying the ingredients and cooking one in my kitchen, including the cost of the time devoted to purchase and cleanup.

We chose cheeseburgers for this experiment because a lot of people eat them, we know how to cook them and it’s easy to match the ingredients in order to create a comparable product. (Our intent is not to encourage cheeseburger consumption or to deprecate veggie burgers).

Rather than assuming an hourly wage to measure the value of food preparation time, we asked what hourly wage would equalize the price of a manufactured versus a home-produced cheeseburger. Anyone who values their time more than this hourly wage is likely to find the manufactured burger more cost-effective.

The purchased burger cost about $4 (not including taxes). The cost of ingredients for a comparable burger came to about $1. Shopping time (counting time only from the front of the grocery store to collection of the specific ingredients) came to about seven minutes. Putting food away and setting out materials required 10 minutes. Actual cooking time came to about eight minutes and cleanup time to five, for a total of 30 minutes.

So, cooking one cheeseburger at home saved about $3 but required 30 minutes of work. Ignoring taxes, small differences in quality, convenience, waiting time at the restaurant, the cost of household utilities, environmental impact, social consequences and human feelings, this implies a break-even wage of about $6 an hour, below the federal minimum wage.

But this calculation changes radically with the number of burgers cooked, because there are significant economies of scale in home cooking. It takes almost the same amount of time to prepare four cheeseburgers as one - about 32 minutes (shopping time and cooking time remain unchanged; setup and cleanup time increase slightly).

The difference in the price of four purchased burgers ($16) and ingredients ($4) for four home-produced ones is $12, which, with 32 minutes preparation time, implies a break-even wage of about $22.50 an hour, still less than my academic salary but a far greater reward for cooking than $6 an hour.

This experiment, however anecdotal, illustrates three important points. First, efforts to encourage people to cook more nutritious and delicious meals at home need to take the value of time into account, which they haven’t always done in the past. This issue also comes up in criticisms of public food assistance programs that assume low-income families always have sufficient time to cook food “from scratch.”

Second, people who cook for one another - whether family or friends - on a regular basis are likely to realize more significant economic benefits than those who cook alone, because there are significant economies of scale in food preparation at home.

Finally, and most importantly, the measurement of “cost-effectiveness” depends which effects you care most about. As the Reid-Kyrk studies emphasized, it’s easier to calculate relative costs per unit consumed than to estimate more indirect, long-run effects on physical and social health.

They believed that household production would continue to play an important economic role because of its contributions to the quality of family and community life. That causality runs both ways.



Friday, July 26, 2013

Open Source Science Fair 2.0

Last night, we hosted our second annual Open Source Science Fair. Our exhibitors showed off their projects using everything from laptops and tablets to custom-made Arduino controllers and robots to tri-fold display boards and glitter glue. After taking a break for dinner, we heard from our keynote speakers Dan Sinker, Haleigh Sheehan and Hilary Mason.

Of course, no science fair is complete without prizes â€" the exhibitors scooped up the following awards:

We also had a few NYTimes exhibitors: Andrew Canaday, Elizabeth Ramirez and Michael Laing gave us a glimpse into their work on WebSockets and news data analytics.

Visit the blog next week for more updates from the event!



Thursday, July 25, 2013

Growth From the Middle Out, and How It Works

Jared Bernstein is a senior fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities in Washington and a former chief economist to Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr.

At the core of President Obama’s economics speech on Wednesday was the notion that as rising inequality diverts income growth from the many Americans in the broad middle class, their diminished buying power leads to slower growth.

It’s an intuitive idea with solid theoretical backing, but is it true?

The theory is simple enough and has its roots in basic microeconomics, specifically the decline in the marginal propensity to consume as incomes rise. That may sound tricky but it’s just common sense: an extra dollar that finds its way to an “income-constrained” (or “poor,” or these days even “middle-class”) person is more likely to be spent than saved.

Bureau of Labor Statistics statistics show, for example, that in 2012, households with income of $40,000 to $50,000 spent 92 percent of their after-tax income. Those with incomes above $150,000 spent 53 percent of their income.

Couple that fact with the fact that consumer spending as a share of gross domestic product in the United States is about 70 percent and you see both the problem and the motivation for the president’s framing. It’s interesting to note that Europe, where the consumption share of G.D.P. is 55 percent, is somewhat less vulnerable to this dynamic.

Another germane point is that back in the late 1970s, before inequality starting climbing, the United States spending share of G.D.P. was 62 percent. So we’ve become more unequal, and the part of G.D.P. that depends on spending has grown. That certainly seems like a recipe for slower growth.

And in the current moment, I agree with the president that it is. The fact that economic growth over this recovery has pretty solidly eluded the poor and middle class is one reason the United States is slogging along at subpar growth rates.

But what about the last recovery? Inequality grew sharply in the 2000s and did so at the expense of the middle class. Using the highly regarded household income series from the Congressional Budget Office, which factors in capital gains (very important when you’re measuring inequality), taxes and the value of government transfers, real middle-class incomes were up 13 percent, 2000-7, while top 1 percent incomes rose 31 percent.

Yet consumer spending wasn’t notably slow in those years. And if you include home-buying, spending was of course through the (overleveraged) roof.

And here’s where things get a lot more interesting. In this interpretation of recent events, higher inequality actually lifts middle-class spending, but it does so based on loose credit leading to the inflation of debt bubbles that ultimately damage growth even more than sluggish consumer spending.

With inequality squeezing paychecks, the only way for middle-class families to get ahead was to borrow. At the same time - and I’d assert this is also a dangerous symptom of wealth concentration and its impact on American politics - bank regulators and credit raters were asleep at the switch, paving the way for financial engineering that artificially depressed the price of risk. Put those toxic factors together and you get the economic shampoo cycle - bubble, bust, repeat - that’s by now all too familiar.

Is there any evidence for this chain of events? There is, from an interesting recent paper by the economists Barry Cynamon and Steven Fazzari. It’s by no means bulletproof; there are lots of moving parts to these arguments, and the fact that we’ve had debt bubbles in periods of low inequality is a substantive challenge to their hypothesis. But I find their circumstantial evidence convincing.

Mr. Cynamon and Professor Fazzari find that as the income shares of the top 5 percent soared relative to the bottom 95 percent, both the debt burden and the spending of the lower-income group grew quickly relative to that of the wealthiest households. The savings rates of the very wealthy increased over the 2000s expansion, while that of the bottom 95 percent fell sharply.

These dynamics drove much stronger consumer spending than one would have expected looking only at median income growth, inflated a huge housing bubble and ensured that once the bubble burst and the deleveraging cycle began, the United States was in for a deep and protracted recession.

My point is that the inequality affects growth through many channels. In demand-constrained periods like the present, it weakens consumer spending and growth because the small share of beneficiaries of what growth there is have lower consumption propensities than everybody else. But in debt-driven expansions, inequality appears to play an integral role in terribly damaging bubbles inflated by stagnant incomes, underpriced risk and leveraged consumption.

So I’m with the president. Let’s get back to broadly shared growth. It’s better for the economy and for most of the people in it. How to do that, especially with this Congress, is a very big problem for another day.



The Complex Story of Race and Upward Mobility

As my colleagues and I were working on our recent article and graphics about a new study on upward mobility, we found ourselves wondering how big a role race played. When you look at our interactive map showing upward-mobility rates by metropolitan area, you can see why.

Many of the areas where climbing the economic ladder is most difficult are also the areas with the largest concentration of African-Americans.

In this map, which ran in Monday’s Times, regions shaded red have low rates of upward mobility; regions shaded yellow have rates in the middle, and blue regions have the highest:

The New York Times

In this map, from the Census Bureau, the shaded regions have larger populations of African-Americans:

Census Bureau


The metropolitan areas with the highest percentage of African-Americans are clustered in the southeast and the industrial Midwest. So are the metropolitan areas where low-income children have the longest odds of making it into the middle class.

Mecklenburg County in North Carolina - the heart of the Charlotte region, which ranks dead last in upward mobility among the 50th largest metropolitan areas, according to the study - is 32 percent black. Georgia’s Fulton County - home to Atlanta, which ranks 49th in mobility among the 50th biggest metropolitan areas - is 45 percent black. Indiana’s Marion County - site of Indianapolis, which ranks 48th - is 27 percent black.

In areas like these, fewer than one in 20 children born into a family into the bottom fifth of the income distribution in the early 1980s has made it to the top fifth as adults, the study found. By contrast, in the regions with the highest mobility, the chances can exceed one in 10. Those regions include some of the whitest parts of the country, like Utah, Idaho, Minnesota, the Dakotas and upper New England.

Yet the economists who did the study do not list race as one of the main factors that explains the variation in upward-mobility rates across regions. How could this be?

The simplest way to explain their conclusion may be to point out that upward mobility tends to be rare for both blacks and whites, as well as for Latinos, in low-mobility areas. In Charlotte, Atlanta and Indianapolis, low-income white children have also tended to grow up to be low-income adults.

To help demonstrate this pattern, the four researchers - Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren of Harvard and Patrick Kline and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley - have produced another map, showing mobility only for metropolitan areas that are at least 80 percent white. (Areas that are less than 80 percent simply appear as blank on the map.)

From From “The Economic Impacts of Tax Expenditures: Evidence from Spatial Variation Across the U.S.,” by Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline and Emmanuel Saez.

The numbers on this map will have little meaning to most readers; they are statistical correlations between family income in one generation and family income in the next. But the message is clear: the mobility patterns look overwhelmingly similar in this map and in the map above showing all metropolitan areas.

It’s worth pointing out that race may still play a role in creating these patterns. “Racial shares in an area do matter,” Mr. Chetty says. “But it’s not race at the individual level. It’s race at the level of the ‘commuting zone,’” he added, using the researchers’ term for a region. Whatever the differences are between high-mobility and low-mobility regions, they seem to apply to residents of every race.

One possibility is that areas with large black populations tend to be more economically segregated, with poor residents - of all races - more likely to be isolated from the rich and middle class. Isolation can damage a low-income family’s chances in many ways, as the Atlanta residents I interviewed explained.

Writing about the new study for The Atlantic, Matthew O’Brien laid out a specific case for how race might have created economic segregation in sprawl-filled regions:

Atlanta, of course, is the prototypical case here: going back to the 1970s, it’s under-invested in public transit, because car-driving suburbanites haven’t wanted to pay for something they think only poor blacks would use (to come, they fear, to their lily-white cul-de-sacs). Even last year, a compromise bill that would have increased the sales tax by 1 percentage point for 10 years to pay for expanded roads and railways in the always-congested city got voted down. This malign neglect of infrastructure keeps low-income people from living near or commuting to better jobs â€" and that’s not a race issue. Indeed, the researchers also found that whites and blacks in Atlanta both have a hard time moving up. In other words, racial polarization might spur sprawl, which makes citiesless likely to invest in their infrastructure â€" and underfunded infrastructure hurts low-income people of all races.

Whatever the precise answer, I assume that economic mobility may have something in common with many other subjects in American life: race matters, but not necessarily in the most obvious ways.



The Complex Story of Race and Upward Mobility

As my colleagues and I were working on our recent article and graphics about a new study on upward mobility, we found ourselves wondering how big a role race played. When you look at our interactive map showing upward-mobility rates by metropolitan area, you can see why.

Many of the areas where climbing the economic ladder is most difficult are also the areas with the largest concentration of African-Americans.

In this map, which ran in Monday’s Times, regions shaded red have low rates of upward mobility; regions shaded yellow have rates in the middle, and blue regions have the highest:

The New York Times

In this map, from the Census Bureau, the shaded regions have larger populations of African-Americans:

Census Bureau


The metropolitan areas with the highest percentage of African-Americans are clustered in the southeast and the industrial Midwest. So are the metropolitan areas where low-income children have the longest odds of making it into the middle class.

Mecklenburg County in North Carolina - the heart of the Charlotte region, which ranks dead last in upward mobility among the 50th largest metropolitan areas, according to the study - is 32 percent black. Georgia’s Fulton County - home to Atlanta, which ranks 49th in mobility among the 50th biggest metropolitan areas - is 45 percent black. Indiana’s Marion County - site of Indianapolis, which ranks 48th - is 27 percent black.

In areas like these, fewer than one in 20 children born into a family into the bottom fifth of the income distribution in the early 1980s has made it to the top fifth as adults, the study found. By contrast, in the regions with the highest mobility, the chances can exceed one in 10. Those regions include some of the whitest parts of the country, like Utah, Idaho, Minnesota, the Dakotas and upper New England.

Yet the economists who did the study do not list race as one of the main factors that explains the variation in upward-mobility rates across regions. How could this be?

The simplest way to explain their conclusion may be to point out that upward mobility tends to be rare for both blacks and whites, as well as for Latinos, in low-mobility areas. In Charlotte, Atlanta and Indianapolis, low-income white children have also tended to grow up to be low-income adults.

To help demonstrate this pattern, the four researchers - Raj Chetty and Nathaniel Hendren of Harvard and Patrick Kline and Emmanuel Saez of the University of California, Berkeley - have produced another map, showing mobility only for metropolitan areas that are at least 80 percent white. (Areas that are less than 80 percent simply appear as blank on the map.)

From From “The Economic Impacts of Tax Expenditures: Evidence from Spatial Variation Across the U.S.,” by Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline and Emmanuel Saez.

The numbers on this map will have little meaning to most readers; they are statistical correlations between family income in one generation and family income in the next. But the message is clear: the mobility patterns look overwhelmingly similar in this map and in the map above showing all metropolitan areas.

It’s worth pointing out that race may still play a role in creating these patterns. “Racial shares in an area do matter,” Mr. Chetty says. “But it’s not race at the individual level. It’s race at the level of the ‘commuting zone,’” he added, using the researchers’ term for a region. Whatever the differences are between high-mobility and low-mobility regions, they seem to apply to residents of every race.

One possibility is that areas with large black populations tend to be more economically segregated, with poor residents - of all races - more likely to be isolated from the rich and middle class. Isolation can damage a low-income family’s chances in many ways, as the Atlanta residents I interviewed explained.

Writing about the new study for The Atlantic, Matthew O’Brien laid out a specific case for how race might have created economic segregation in sprawl-filled regions:

Atlanta, of course, is the prototypical case here: going back to the 1970s, it’s under-invested in public transit, because car-driving suburbanites haven’t wanted to pay for something they think only poor blacks would use (to come, they fear, to their lily-white cul-de-sacs). Even last year, a compromise bill that would have increased the sales tax by 1 percentage point for 10 years to pay for expanded roads and railways in the always-congested city got voted down. This malign neglect of infrastructure keeps low-income people from living near or commuting to better jobs â€" and that’s not a race issue. Indeed, the researchers also found that whites and blacks in Atlanta both have a hard time moving up. In other words, racial polarization might spur sprawl, which makes citiesless likely to invest in their infrastructure â€" and underfunded infrastructure hurts low-income people of all races.

Whatever the precise answer, I assume that economic mobility may have something in common with many other subjects in American life: race matters, but not necessarily in the most obvious ways.



College Counseling and Job Prospects

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Inflationphobia, Part III

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Support for College Students and Banks: Not So Different

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Who Works the Longest Days

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The New Economics of Part-Time Employment, Continued

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A Mobility Prophet

Only 26 years ago, one of the country's most respected economists argued that social mobility was a problem largely solved. Birth rarely dictated a child's destiny, suggested Gary Becker, in a 1987 speech to fellow economists. Children born rich often ended up poor, and children born poor often ended up rich. “Low earnings as well as high earnings,” said Mr. Becker, a University of Chicago professor who won a Nobel five years later, “are not strongly transmitted from fathers to sons.”

He had empirical evidence for his claim. Academic research at the time showed that the relationship between the earnings of different generations in a family was not especially strong. In technical terms, the correlation was so low: regardless of parents' income, children's income often reverted to the mean.

I first came across those findings, and Mr. Becker's description of them, almost a decade ago, when reporting a series of articles for The Times on social class. At the time, Gary Solon, an economist of the University of Michigan, was one of the researchers considered to be on the cutting edge of mobility research. And Mr. Solon argued that Mr. Becker's conclusions were mostly wrong.

Mr. Solon and other economists pointed out that tracking people over many years was quite difficult. The early studies of mobility, many of them done in the 1980s, suffered from these difficulties. As Janny Scott and I wrote in 2005:

Some studies relied on children's fuzzy recollections of their parents' income. Others compared single years of income, which fluctuate considerably. Still others misread the normal progress people make as they advance in their careers, like from young lawyer to senior partner, as social mobility.

When Mr. Solon and others looked at the new data that was emerging in the 1990s, they found that previous studies had confused statistical noise with evidence of a highly fluid society. When researchers were able to use accurate measures of people's earnings, the relationship between the fortunes of parents and their children was quite strong. Most surprisingly, economists came to believe that a child's chances of overcoming poverty in the United States were lower than in many other rich countries, despite our more egalitarian history.

“We all know stories of poor families in which the next generation did much better,” Mr. Solon, now a professor at Michigan State, told me almost a decade ago. “It isn't that poor families have no chance.” But in the past, he added, “People would say, ‘Don't worry about inequality. The offspring of the poor have chances as good as the chances of the offspring of the rich.' Well, that's not true. It's not respectable in scholarly circles anymore to make that argument.”

At the time, even the new data was imperfect. Mr. Solon and other economists had to rely on surveys of several thousand families, some of whom dropped out of the panel, never to be surveyed again. (Mobility research, unlike research on inequality at a moment in time, depends on following the same people or families over many years.) In the last 10 years, however, the data on mobility has become better - much better. In a recent study, four economists were able to analyze millions of earnings records over more than three decades, as I reported on Monday.

One of the most striking aspects of this study, which economists say offers the most comprehensive picture of mobility yet, is how closely its findings match Mr. Solon's. The numerical comparison of parents' and children's earnings - the statistical correlation between the two - is nearly identical, notes Jonathan Parker, a finance professor at M.I.T. (who did not work on the recent study).

Raj Chetty, a Harvard economist and one of the four co-authors, said the findings helped make clear Mr. Solon's importance as a researcher. “What I find especially impressive is that many of his insights - most importantly that the U.S. has substantially lower mobility than previously thought - are basically borne out by our new data that is thousands of times larger,” Mr. Chetty said.

Sometimes, a huge batch of new information overturns old assumptions. But sometimes it confirms them.



Obama\'s View of the Economic Challenge

President Obama speaking Wednesday in Galesburg, Ill.Stephen Crowley/The New York Times President Obama speaking Wednesday in Galesburg, Ill.

President Obama's speech in Galesburg, Ill., is more a description of how things are than a plan to get them to where they should be. It lays out Mr. Obama's vision of how the economy has changed to the detriment of American workers, if not American businesses and executives, over the last 30 years or so, since long before the recession hit:

In the period after World War II, a growing middle class was the engine of our prosperity. Whether you owned a company, swept its floors, or worked anywhere in between, this country offered you a basic bargain â€" a sense that your hard work would be rewarded with fair wages and benefits, the chance to buy a home, to save for retirement, and, above all, to hand down a better life for your kids.

But over time, that engine began to stall. That bargain began to fray. Technology made some jobs obsolete. Global competition sent others overseas. It became harder for unions to fight for the middle class. Washington doled out bigger tax cuts to the rich and smaller minimum wage increases for the working poor. The link between higher productivity and people's wages and salaries was severed â€" the income of the top 1 percent nearly quadrupled from 1979 to 2007, while the typical family's barely budged.

Towards the end of those three decades, a housing bubble, credit cards, and a churning financial sector kept the economy artificially juiced up. But by the time I took office in 2009, the bubble had burst, costing millions of Americans their jobs, their homes and their savings. The decades-long erosion of middle-class security was laid bare for all to see and feel.

In other words, the returns to labor just are not as high as they used to be. Robots and computers and globalization have in many cases made your average American worker less valuable â€" particularly if he or she is less educated. For a while, the housing bubble and cheap credit papered over those problems. But once the bubble burst and the recession hit, the problems afflicting millions of households became obvious.

Still, Mr. Obama notes that things are getting better: The cyclical recovery from the recession has truly taken hold, even if structural problems remain. Here are some of the statistics he cites:

  • Over the past 40 months, our businesses have created 7.2 million new jobs. This year, we are off to our strongest private-sector job growth since 1999.
  • We sell more products made in America to the rest of the world than ever before.
  • As a country, we've recovered faster and gone further than most other advanced nations in the world.

He also blames Congress â€" as the Federal Reserve, the International Monetary Fund and many others have done â€" for instituting cuts that have made the cyclical recovery slower.

Rather than reduce our deficits with a scalpel â€" by cutting programs we don't need, fixing ones we do, and making government more efficient â€" this same group has insisted on leaving in place a meat cleaver called the sequester that has cost jobs, harmed growth, hurt our military, and gutted investments in American education and scientific and medical research that we need to make this country a magnet for good jobs.

Economists generally believe that the $85 billion in sudden budget cuts instituted this year have been less harmful than they originally thought they would be. Still, they have slowed down the recovery by taking money out of workers' and business' pockets. Mr. Obama also notes that Congress' refusal to raise the debt ceiling, the government's statutory borrowing limit, this fall would put undue stress on the economy.

But Mr. Obama does not really propose any policy specifics to tackle the structural problems he says he believes remain the greatest challenge to the American middle class â€" the rising inequality and stagnant wages.

Granted, he's tried to tackle them before. The Affordable Care Act at its heart taxes the wealthy to provide insurance coverage to lower-income households. His tax bill also raises levies on the rich, while cementing tax cuts for the middle class and working poor. But he has no such specific proposals in this speech, at least, only running through the same broad policy goals he and his team have outlined for some time, for infrastructure spending, education, housing finance and manufacturing.



Strongest Since 1999?

“Add it all up, and over the past 40 months, our businesses have created 7.2 million new jobs. This year, we are off to our strongest private-sector job growth since 1999.”

So said President Obama in a speech in Illinois on Wednesday. And by one measure he has the facts to back him up, at least for now. But those facts could easily be revised away next week, when the July jobs report comes out. And no one reading that statement should overlook that he said “private sector.” If you talk about all jobs, the record is not nearly so impressive.

First, the 7.2 million number is accurate. Private-sector employment hit bottom for the recent cycle in February 2010, at 106,850,000. In June, it was 114,051,000, or 7,201,000 higher.

Over the same stretch, governments have reduced employment by 619,000, leaving the total gain at 6.6 million.

As for the strongest start since 1999, that is also accurate, at least if you use the number of jobs, rather than the percentage change.

This year, private-sector employment rose by 1,234,000 jobs during the first six months. That is more than in any comparable period since 1999.

But comparing gross numbers can be misleading. This year's gain of 1.0938 percent is not as good as the 2011 gain over the same period, which was 1.12 percent, or 1,209,000 jobs. And on a percentage basis it was also a smidgen below the 2005 first half, when 1,211,000 jobs, or 1.0942 percent, were added.

Even by Mr. Obama's preferred way of counting, those two years could be better if the July report revises the June figure down by 26,000 jobs. That would not be an unusually large revision.

On a percentage basis, by the way, every first half from 1993 through 1999 was better than the 2013 first half.



The Multinational Equation on Jobs

In his speech on Wednesday, President Obama said:

This year, we are off to our strongest private-sector job growth since 1999. And because we bet on this country, foreign companies are, too. Right now, more of Honda's cars are made in America than anywhere else. Airbus will build new planes in Alabama. Companies like Ford are replacing outsourcing with insourcing and bringing more jobs home.

Is it true that foreign companies are “betting” on the United States, and that American multinationals are returning jobs here in large numbers?

The most recent Bureau of Economic Analysis data available on multinational companies' employment in the United States is for 2011, unfortunately. But those data do show that the total number of people working for American affiliates of foreign companies rose 3.3 percent that year, up to 5.6 million workers from 5.4 million in 2010. That rate of increase was higher than that for total American private industry employment that year, which was 1.8 percent.

Even so, total employment at these American affiliates of foreign companies had fallen sharply during the recession, and so its 2011 level was about the same as it was in 2002 through 2008, when the population was smaller.

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

As for American multinational companies (like Ford, which Mr. Obama cited), their employment in the United States actually stayed flat from 2009 to 2011 while they hired in large numbers abroad. From 2009 to 2011, domestic employment at these American companies was 22.9 million, while the number of employees abroad rose to 11.7 million from 10.8 million.

As a result, the share of employment at these American companies that is based at home has been shrinking, to 66.3 percent in 2011 from 79 percent in 1989:

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.

None of those employment numbers will capture work contracted out to other companies, of course (e.g., Taiwan-headquartered Foxconn does a lot of manufacturing for American companies like Apple).