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Friday, December 7, 2012

How Medicare Is Misrepresented

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Uwe E. Reinhardt is an economics professor at Princeton. He has some financial interests in the health care field.

A common phrase in the current debate over the so-called fiscal cliff is “Medicare needs to be restructured.” The term serves as code for policies unlikely to be appealing to voters, a term that can mean everything and, thus, nothing.

The question is what problem restructuring is to solve in traditional Medicare, which remains one of the most popular health insurance programs in this country. People who use this vague term should always be challenged to explain exactly why and how Medicare should be changed.

Critics of traditional Medicare â€" even those who should know better â€" often accuse it of being “fee for service.” It is a strange accusation. After all, fee-for-service remains the dominant method of paying the providers of health care under private insurance, including Medicare Advantage, the option of private coverage open to all Medicare beneficiaries.

Describing Medicare as fee-for-service insurance is about as thoughtful as describing a horse as “an animal that has four legs,” a characteristic shared by many other animals. The practice is particularly odd, given that traditional Medicare as early as the 1 970s was the first program to develop so-called “bundled payments” for hospital inpatient care â€" the diagnostically related groupings, known as D.R.G. â€" in place of fee-for-service payment of hospitals, an innovation that has since been copied around the globe.

A more descriptive term for traditional Medicare would be “free choice of providers” or “unmanaged care” insurance. These features, of course, would hardly be viewed as shortcomings among people covered by traditional Medicare or their families. Neither term would be a good marketing tool among voters for proposals to abandon traditional Medicare.

In this regard, it may be helpful to list the various contractual relationships that can exist between the insured and insurers, on the one hand, and the various methods of paying the providers of care, on the other:

Indemnity Insurance: This is the oldest form of health insurance. It offers the insured free choice of health care provider and of treatment, which is why such policies tend to be expensive.

Under indemnity insurance, providers of care are typically paid on a fee-for-service basis. Insurers usually pay a stipulated fraction (say 80 percent) of the providers' bills for covered services. Patients absorb the rest in the form of deductibles and coinsurance (e.g., 20 percent of the providers' bill). Under some policies, insurers ask patients to pay providers first and then seek reimbursement from the insurer.

Managed-Care Contracts: The other three insurance contracts shown in the display â€" H.M.O., P.P.O. and P.O.S. contracts â€" are generally lumped together under the generic term “managed care.” It is another ill-defined term that can mean a host of specific limitations on the insured's freedom of choice.

Doctors may assert that it is they who manage the medical treatments. But in health-policy circles, the term managed care means that the doctor's medical treatments are subject to external constraints imposed by a private regulator - the patient's health insurer - although, in principle, public insurers could “manage” care as well, if legislators permitted it.

These externally imposed constraints may take the form of formularies for prescription drugs or prior authorization by the insurer for specific procedures â€" e.g., expensive imaging or elective surgery â€" before the insurer agrees to pay for the procedures. They may mean exclusion from coverage of procedures deemed by the i nsurer to have a low expected benefit-cost ratio. While Congress forbids Medicare to let cost-benefit analysis guide its coverage decisions, private insurers are not subject to that constraint.

Finally, managed care techniques might include the external coordination of medical treatments that involved multiple providers of health care, especially the treatment of chronic disease, often by subcontracted companies specializing in care coordination.

These are the major forms of managed care insurance contracts.

Health Maintenance Organizations (H.M.O.): These contracts represent the most restrictive form of managed care. The insurer provides covered health care benefits through a network of health care providers under contract to the insurer, with zero or very modest cost-sharing at point of service on the part of the insured.

In a staff model H.M.O., the insurer actu ally owns the health care facilities and health professionals are the insurer's salaried employees. More commonly, the H.M.O. merely contracts with a set of otherwise independent providers that are paid negotiated fees or, for primary care, sometimes annual capitation payments per patient on the doctor's list.

Usually, in an H.M.O., the insured is asked to select one from a roster of primary-care doctors who regulates referrals to specialists. In principle, under an H.M.O. contract the insured is confined to the H.M.O.'s network of providers for covered services and pays in full out-of-pocket for health care procured outside that network.

Preferred Provider Organizations (P.P.O.): A popular alternative to the strictly limited choice under H.M.O.'s is a Preferred Provider Organization. Under that contract, the insurer negotiates prices with a network of “preferred” providers of care and the insured can contact specialists without a required referral by a primary-care doctor.

For the most part these providers in the network are paid on a fee-for-service basis as well, often X times the Medicare fee schedule, where X could be smaller than 1 but usually exceeds 1, where X is negotiated between the insurer and providers. The insured usually faces an annual deductible and relatively modest copays (dollar amounts, not fractions of the fees) if they obtain care from a provider in the network.

If the insured obtains care from a provider outside the P.P.O.'s network, the insurer will reimburse the insured only at what the insurer considers a reasonable fee, leaving the insured to pay any billed fee above that reimbursement. According to a report by the American Health Insurance Plans, these out-of-network fees can be exorbitantly high, which serves as a natural constraint on the free choice of provider under P.P.O.'s.

Point of Service (P.O.S.) Contracts: These contracts are combinations of H.M.O. and P.P.O. contracts. The insured still must select a primary-care doctor who coordinates the insured's overall medical care, but patients can procure covered care from providers outside the H.M.O.'s network, albeit at high rates of cost-sharing. In that regard the arrangement resembles a P.P.O.

High-Deductible Health Plans (H.D.H.P.): These contracts couple indemnity- or preferred-provider (P.P.O.) insurance with very high annual deductibles, sometimes exceeding $10,000 for a famil y. The theory is that by putting the insured's skin in the game, these plans will give patients an incentive to shop around for cost-effective health care. Some call them “Consumer-Directed Health Plans” (C.D.H.P.'s), because in theory they elevate “consumers” (formerly “patients”) to act as the chief managers of their own health care. However, the requisite information for shopping around has not generally been available to patients, forcing them to function in health care as would blindfolded shoppers in a department store.

What the critics of traditional, government-run Medicare actually find wanting in traditional Medicare is that it basically is classic indemnity insurance. It offers its enrollees free choice of doctor, hospital and other providers, and doctors relatively free choice of treatments, while most private insurers typically no longer do.

In other words, the complaint is that health care rendered under traditional Medicare is unmanaged care. These features, of course, are precisely the reason why in the eyes of the public traditional Medicare is still one of the most popular insurance products.

A case can be made, on theoretical and sometimes empirical grounds, that properly managed or coordinated care can on average yield superior medical treatments, at lower cost, than completely unmanaged care under classical indemnity insurance.

The problem has been and continues to be that this is not the folklore among patients or doctors. The latter, as noted, generally believe they can manage their patients' care properly without outside interference into their clinical decisions. Among patients and doctors, the term managed care is still not quite respectable.

This can explain why critics of traditional Medicare delicately but nonsensically prefer to decry it as being fee for service rather than as free-choice-of-providers insurance or unmanaged-care insurance.



Thursday, December 6, 2012

Gauging the Storm\'s Impact on Hiring

Just how big an effect will Hurricane Sandy have on employment?

That's the question looming ahead of Friday's announcement of the latest employment figures for November by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The consensus of economists surveyed by Bloomberg is that the report will show a net gain of 86,000 jobs last month, with the rate of unemployment remaining at 7.9 percent. But many widely followed economists are citing much lower figures for job creation.

Dean Maki, chief United States economist at Barclays, estimates hiring to have increased by only 50,000, a sharp drop from an average of 170,000 new positions added monthly in August, September and October. “This doesn't dramatically change our outlook,” he said. “It's evidence of just how powerful an effect Sandy had on the monthly figures.”

Ethan Harris, co-head of global economics at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, is slightly more optimistic, estimating 60,000 jobs were created in November. But he's quick to point out that the underlying rate of job creation is healthier than the numbers suggest. If it were not for the storm, he estimates hiring wou ld have jumped in November by 140,000.

“The labor market is very much in the recovery stage,” Mr. Harris said. However, he added, “It's a long way from full health with workers having little negotiating power when it comes to raises.”

Mr. Harris said he would be watching the figures closely for hiring in the retail sector as the holiday shopping season begins. One danger is that consumers will hold back on spending in order to pay for home repairs in the storm's aftermath, he said.

He is also waiting to see if worries about the fiscal impasse in Washington weigh on consumers. “Before the election, the fiscal cliff was a worry for the business sector,” Mr. Harris said. “Now it's front page news.”

Economists are also looking for possible upward revisions in estimated job creation for past months, said Nigel Gault, chief United States economist for IHS Global Insight. In October, the economy created an estimated 171,000 jobs, with government statisticians revising their figures for September and August higher.



Open Source Science Fair Video

Did you miss our Open Source Science Fair last month? Or are you just ready to relive all the fun of it? Either way, you'll want to watch the videos of the event. Thanks to NYT developer David Seguin for his excellent camera work. Enjoy!

Watch more Open Source Science Fair videos on YouTube



The Real Fiscal Risks in the United States

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Simon Johnson is the Ronald A. Kurtz Professor of Entrepreneurship at the M.I.T. Sloan School of Management.

A great deal of attention is currently focused on the notion that a “fiscal cliff” of higher taxes and spending cuts awaits at the end of this year. The good news is that politicians are finally talking about the budget â€" and working hard to communicate their competing messages regarding what should be done to put public finance on a more sustainable footing.

The bad news is that almost the entire national conversation on deficits and debts misses the real fiscal risks that we face.

There are three major is sues.

First, the main risk is that in the near future the government will do too little by way of fiscal adjustment.

The drama of the word “cliff” and the image of falling off it makes things seem more worse than they are. To be sure, if all the scheduled tax increases and spending cuts go into effect, 2013 would be a difficult year â€" although there is no sign that this kind of fiscal adjustment would lead to the problems of the financial crisis of 2008.

The politicians will do a deal. Probably not now, when the Republicans are pressed to raise tax rates â€" this goes too deeply against what has become an ideology over the last 30 years.

It will be much easier to reach an agreement in January or February, when tax rates have gone up - which they will do automatically, if there is no agreement by Dec. 31 â€" and the Republicans are being asked to vote for what would presumably include cutting tax rates for middle-class Americans relative to those new levels.

But the deal to be struck between the White House and the Republican House will probably be too small to adequately address our fiscal issues.

If we want to start putting federal government debt on a more sustainable path, we should find a path to fiscal adjustment that undoes the net effect on the budget of the George W. Bush-era tax cuts, which represent about $4 trillion over the next 10 years. You can do that through revenue or through spending reductions, but that is the right goal to aim for â€" putting our federal finances back closer to where they were in the late 1990s. (For a primer, I recommend this piece by my colleague James Kwak.)

Such a change would put government debt on track to stabilize around 40 to 50 percent of gross domestic product by 2030 â€" an entirely reasonable and responsible goal. (In “White House Burning: The Founding Fathers, Our National Debt, and Why It Matters to You,” James and I run through alternative scenarios and discuss the policy options. You can tweak the numbers up or down somewhat, but the most important goal is to take debt off its current explosive path.)

President Obama has suggested a headline number for fiscal adjustment of $1.6 trillion, while the recent Republicans counterbid was $800 billion â€" both over 10 years (a standard accounting convention for this kind of discussion.)

Irrespective of how you feel about the policy combination each si de is proposing, the “big numbers” are too small.

The United States doesn't need to do more immediately. In contrast to many parts of Europe, we have some time to make our fiscal adjustments â€" particularly while interest rates remain low. The country should phase in a big part of its needed fiscal adjustment as the economy recovers. For example, part of any budget adjustment should be linked to employment relative to G.D.P. â€" any tax cuts in the new year could be phased out as the economy recovers.

Second, the working assumption of all American politicians is that the dollar will remain the predominant reserve currency indefinitely â€" the United States is the safe haven for investors and governments around the world. They particularly regard United States government debt as a safe asset in troubled times â€" and this is what allows us to borrow so much at low interest rates. (For a brief history of public debt in the United States â€" including how it ha s been useful in the past and how overreliance on foreign borrowing now makes us vulnerable, see the PBS NewsHour profile of “White House Burning.”)

About half of all federal government debt outstanding is held by foreigners. Sooner or later, foreigners will want to buy less United States debt. Either they will want to hold other assets â€" the fashion in currencies comes and goes over time, just like everything else â€" or they will save less (in which case they may hold onto their existing United States government debt but not want to buy so much of new issues).

Many countries hold their foreign reserves in dollars and have built these up over time. China, for example, holds over $1 trillion (the exact number is not public information; some people say the true number is significantly higher). This is far more than China needs, and it is no surprise that its interest in b uying more United States Treasury debt is waning (see the latest official data).

No American politician wants to talk in public about what the implications of shifts in China's savings and investments would be on our ability to finance federal government debt at reasonable interest rates. The middle class will pay more tax or receive fewer benefits, or both, over the coming decades â€" that's the inconvenient math of the Congressional Budget Office. Which politician wants to level with voters on the scale of this issue?

The third risk is that our process of fiscal adjustment will undermine social insurance, primarily Social Security and Medicare.

We insure each other against outliving our assets and encountering an expensive version of ill health in old age. This insurance is mostly run through the federal government, for one simple reason. There was no private ins urance market for older Americans before Medicare was created â€" and there will be none if Medicare is phased out or withers.

The most likely situation is this. After much shouting, a fiscal deal is reached in the new year â€" with a headline adjustment of around $1 trillion over 10 years, and perhaps with a 50-50 split between tax increases and spending cuts. Public attention recedes. Commentators proclaim that the budget problem has been fixed.

But then we hit a real fiscal crisis, with foreigners declining to buy newly issued Treasury paper and interest rates on that debt â€" and interest rates more broadly throughout the economy â€" rising sharply. The Federal Reserve fights to keep interest rates down, but its monetary policy in that instance is regarded as inflationary, further destabilizing the situation.

That crisis â€" date unknown but intense for sure â€" forces much more damaging fiscal cuts, including cuts in Medicare but also across the board (and bringing higher taxes). This is exactly the kind of disruptive fiscal austerity that damages an economy. One such dramatic, even humiliating, potential scenario is described in gripping detail in the opening pages of “Eclipse” by Arvind Subramanian (my colleague at the Peterson Institute for International Economics).

We end up poorer, more unequal and struggling to remember how we ever cared for one another in old age.



Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Poverty Should Have Risen

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Casey B. Mulligan is an economics professor at the University of Chicago. He is the author of “The Redistribution Recession: How Labor Market Distortions Contracted the Economy.”

When measured to include taxes and government benefits, poverty did not rise between 2007 and 2011, and that shows why government policy is seriously off track.

When somebody earns, say, $10,000 by working, he should keep some of it for himself and his family rather th an handing it all over to the government. By the same reasoning, when someone loses $10,000 by not working, he should get some help from the government or from others in the forms of reduced taxes and enhanced benefits but still should bear a portion of that loss himself.

Economists debate the fraction of wages that workers should keep for themselves, because the optimal fraction is a trade-off between incentives, insurance, support of public goods, freedom and other factors. Libertarians and other believers in small governments might set the fraction at 80 percent or more. Other economists think that incentives have an effect on behavior, but incentive effects are small, so we can safely set the fraction at 30 percent, or even a bit less.

But I thought econ omists agreed that the fraction should not be zero, so that people losing money by not working would bear a portion of the loss. If people with declining incomes found them entirely replaced by government help, that amounts to 100 percent taxation (providing more benefits as income falls is sometimes called “implicit taxation”).

As James Tobin, a John F. Kennedy adviser, Nobel laureate and leading Keynesian economist of his day, said in a 1965 article, a 100 percent tax rate causes “needless waste and demoralization,” adding:

This application of the means test is bad economics as well as bad sociology. It is almost as if our present programs of public assistance had been consciously contrived to perpetuate the conditions they are supposed to alleviate.

Professor Tobin called the 100 percent tax situation demoralizing because the affected people find that all of the benefits of their hard work and success go to the government in the form of more tax receipts and fewer benefit payments. The unintended result would be less work and more families earning less than the poverty line, which is why Professor Tobin described such policies as perpetuating poverty.

If, as economists recommend, everybody's tax rate is effectively less than 100 percent, then someone with disposable income of, say, 110 percent of the poverty line should find himself falling into poverty when he loses his job. His living standards would not fall to zero because he should be getting some help in terms of reduced taxes and increased benefits. But optimally his disposable income would fall to 80 percent of the poverty line, and perhaps below, until he found a new job.

Under the Obama administration, workers with disposable income in the neighborhood of the poverty line did not, on average, see their job losses during the recession translate into significant reductions in their disposable income.

As Jared Bernst ein put it, America had “the deepest recession since the Great Depression and poverty didn't go up.” He shows that the percentage of people in households with disposable income less than the poverty line was 15 percent in 2011, just as it was in 2007 before the recession began. In fact, the percentage fell a bit after 2008 when the stimulus law went into effect.

The results suggest that the government was helping too much. If they had been following the advice of Professor Tobin and all other economists who say they believe that tax rates should be less than 100 percent, the fraction of households with disposable income below the poverty line would have risen as a consequence of millions of lost jobs, just less than it would have without any government help.

Mr. Bernstein, one of the Obama administration advisers who designed the stimulus law and said it would quickly push the unemployment rate below 8 percent, appears to be unaware that it is possible for the government to help too much by creating the kind of situation Professor Tobin described and depress the economy in the process. Mr. Bernstein fails to mention incentives in any way and instead describes the poverty results as “a real accomplishment and a sign of a far more civilized society.”

Erasing incentives is not the way to a civilized society but rather to an impoverished one.



Tuesday, December 4, 2012

Hack Day 2012: Get Ready!

This year's TimesOpen Hack Day is just a few days away. On Saturday, Dec. 8, developers, designers and technologists will come to the Times building to see where their ideas and skills lead them.

The main hack roomThe main hack room

The day is mostly unstructured - this is your day. Here's what you can expect:

  • More than 100 hackers
  • Side sessions (optional) from Spotify, the Echo Nest, Tumblr and Google (and The New York Times, of course!)
  • A hardware hacking demo
  • Lightning rounds and prizes
  • Space and t ime and nourishment to support a full day of creativity and brilliance!

If you haven't registered yet, grab a ticket now. We hope to see you Saturday.



Monday, December 3, 2012

The Debt Limit Is the Real Fiscal Cliff

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Bruce Bartlett held senior policy roles in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations and served on the staffs of Representatives Jack Kemp and Ron Paul. He is the author of “The Benefit and the Burden: Tax Reform â€" Why We Need It and What It Will Take.”

Washington is all abuzz over the impending tax increases and spending cuts referred to as the fiscal cliff, an absurdly inaccurate term that both Democrats and Republicans have unfortunately adopted in order to pursue their own agendas. In truth, it is a nonproblem unless every impending tax increase and spending cut takes effect permanently â€" something so unlikely as to be effectively impossible.

In my opinion, the fiscal cliff is akin to the so called Y2K problem in late 1999, when many people worried that computers would freeze, elevators would stop running and planes would fall from the sky. Of course, nothing of the kind happened.

So if the fiscal cliff is a faux problem, why do we hear that industry and financial markets are deeply fearful of it? The answer is that there is a very real fiscal problem that will occur almost simultaneously â€" expiration of the debt limit. Much of what passes for fiscal-cliff concern is actually anxiety about whether Republicans in Congress will force a default on the nation's debt in pursuit of their radical agenda.

No less an authority than the anti-tax activist Grover Norquist, who basically controls the Republican Party's fiscal policy, has said repeatedly that the debt limit is where the real fight will be over the next several weeks. In a Nov. 28 interview with Politico's Mike Allen, he was asked about the leverage President Obama has over Republicans in the fiscal-cliff debate. Mr. Norquist replied that Republicans have vastly more leverage when it comes to the debt limit.

MR. NORQUIST: Well, the Republicans also have other leverage, continuing resolutions on spending and the debt ceiling increase. They can give him debt-ceiling increases once a month. They can have him on a rather short leash, on a small â€" you know, here's your allowance, come back next month if you've behaved.

MR. ALLEN: O.K., O.K., wait. You're proposing that the debt ceiling be increased month by month?

MR. NORQUIST: Monthly. Monthly. Monthly if he's good, weekly if he's not. I mean, look, it's an accordion, it's an accordion, because if you're really â€" well, that's what they did â€" remember the first few months of the Obama â€" when the Republicans took the House and the Senate â€" took the House, they said, “O.K., here's two weeks of continuing resolutions because you have saved $4 billion. Oh, now you've agreed to $8 billion in savings, you may have four weeks.” And they basically did â€" and what happened with the freshmen â€" remember, the Tea Party guys who just came in said: “This is taking too long. Let's ask for it all.” And as soon as you asked for it all, you only got half of what you asked for, whereas you were getting everything you wanted. You were doing three yards in a cloud of dust, and you had â€" now, all those freshmen, newbie Tea Party guys are veterans. They would understand this time around why three yards in a cloud of dust for seven months is winning.

In short, the debt limit is a hostage that Republicans are willing to kill or maim in pursuit of their agenda. They have made this clear ever since the debt ceiling debate in 2011, in which the Treasury came very close to defaulting on the debt.

As Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the Senate minority leader, explained:

I think some of our members may have thought the default issue was a hostage you might take a chance at shooting. Most of us didn't think that. What we did learn is this - it's a hostage that's worth ransoming.

At the risk of stating the obvious, the debt limit is nuts. It serves no useful purpose to allow members of Congress to vote for vast cuts in taxation and increases in spending and then tell the Treasury it is not permitted to sell bonds to cover the deficits Congress created. To my knowledge, no other nation has such a screwy system.

Nevertheless, we have a debt limit that is denominated in dollar terms; it is breached when the debt subject to limit, which includes bonds the government itself holds in various trust funds, rises above that limit. Currently, it is $16.394 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that given current spending and revenue trends, that figure will be reached before the end of the year.

At that point, Treasury will have to take extraordinary and costly measures to avoid technically hitting the debt ceiling. But these measures pro vide only a month or so of breathing room. At some point, Treasury will lack the cash to pay the bills that are due and it will face nothing but unthinkable choices â€" don't pay interest to bondholders and default on the debt, don't pay Social Security benefits, don't pay our soldiers in the field and so on.

In a new book, “Is U.S. Government Debt Different?,” Howell Jackson, a law professor at Harvard, walks through options for prioritizing government spending in the event that Republicans insist on committing financial suicide. They are all illegal or unconstitutional to one degree or another. They would require the Treasury to either abrogate Congress's taxing power, spending power or borrowing power.

In the October issue of the Columbia Law Review, Professors Neil H. Buchanan of the George Washington University Law School and Michael C. Dorf of Cornell Law School examine the question of what a president should do when he must act and all his options are unconstitutional. They cite Abraham Lincoln's July 4, 1861, message to Congress in support of the idea that some laws are more unconstitutional than others and the president is empowered to violate the one that is least unconstitutional when he has no other option.

Said Lincoln, “To state the question more directly, are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”

In the present case, of course, the one law would be the debt limit, which Professors Buchanan and Dorf say is less binding on the president than unilaterally cutting spending or raising taxes without congressional approval. Hence, if Republicans are truly mad and absolutely refuse to raise the debt limit, thereby risking default or the nonpayment of essential government bills, Professors Buchanan and Dorf believe the president would have the authority to sell bonds over and above the limit.

There are a host of practical problems any time the president is forced into uncharted constitutional territory, as Lincoln so often was. But when faced with an extortion demand from a political party that no longer feels bound by the historical norms of conduct, the president must be willing to do what has to be done.